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HUMAN PERSONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
THE DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE OF
GLOBAL JUSTICE
Robert Hockett*
ABSTRACT
It is common for economically oriented transnational legal
theorists to think and communicate mainly in maximizing terms. It is
less common for them to notice that each time we speak explicitly of
maximizing one thing, we speak implicitly of distributing another
thing and equalizing yet another thing. Moreover, we effectively define
ourselves and our fellow humans by reference to that which we
equalize. For it is in virtue of the latter that our global welfare
formulations treat us as "counting" for purposes of globally
aggregating and maximizing.
To analyze maximization language on the one hand, and
equalization and identification language on the other, is to "take
distribution seriously" in legal and policy analysis. It is to recognize
that law and policy are as distributive and person-defining as they
are aggregative. It is also to recognize that law and policy treat us as
equals in some respects-those by which they identify and "count" us
as politically relevant-and as non-equals in other respects. Explicitly
attending to these "respects" brings transparency about the degrees to
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which our laws and policies identify, "count," and treat us as equals
in the right respects.
This Article addresses how to take distribution seriously in
transnational legal and policy analysis. It does so by two means,
keyed to the principal ways in which distribution is typically
implicated in legal and policy analysis: first, by careful attention to
the internal structures of the global welfare functions favored by most
economically oriented analysts; and second, by reference to what
linguists call the "cognitive grammar" of non-formal distributive
language, a structure that mirrors the structure of distribution itself
Both modes of analysis yield a workable method to test proposed
maximization norms for their normative propriety, and an attractive
distributive ethic that can serve as a normative touchstone for
transnational legal and policy proposals.
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INTRODUCTION
Assume you are a globally oriented legal theorist, welfare
economist, or policy analyst committed to some normative "master
principle." You believe law and policy ought to concern themselves
solely or mainly with "welfare," say, or with "well-being,"
"happiness," or some other such thing. As a result, you say we should
"maximize" this thing. To that end, if you employ formal methods in
conducting and communicating your analyses, you employ
maximization formulae-most likely Bergson-Samuelson global
welfare functions or some variant thereof.'
1. See Abram Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare
Economics, 52 Q.J. Econ. 310-34 (1938) (examining value judgments necessary
for deriving conditions of maximum economic welfare); see also Kenneth J. Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) (stating that economics reflects the
making of different types of social choices among different people and societies);
Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) (writing
generally that meaningful theorems in diverse fields of economic affairs are
derived from two basic hypotheses, one of which is that the condition of
equilibrium is equivalent to the maximization of a certain magnitude). I provide
formal characterizations of my own in Robert Hockett, The Impossibility of a
Prescriptive Paretian (Cornell Law Sch. Leg. Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 06-027, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=930460. The
apparatus of global welfare functions is illuminatingly adapted to legal and global
policy analysis in Matthew Adler, Well-Being, Inequality, and Time: The Time
Slice Problem and Its Policy Implications (Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Univ. Penn.
Law Sch., Paper No. 07-30, 2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1006871.
Also illuminating, if ultimately insupportable, is Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness versus Welfare (2002) (arguing that social decisions should be made
based on their expected effects on welfare, and not on notions of fairness, justice,
and the like). The troubling nature of the book is visible from its face, with the
title alone manifesting a rudimentary error in categorization: "Fairness" denotes
a pattern of distribution, "welfare" an object of distribution that itself is
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It might have escaped your notice, but in doing these things,
you do other things, too. Implicitly, you are thinking and advocating
not only in terms of maximizing, but also in terms of distributing,
and even equalizing. For in globally maximizing anything, we always
are spreading one thing, and equalizing yet another. What is more,
we effectively are defining ourselves and our fellow persons by
reference to what we equalize. The attributes that "count" for
purposes of global maximization are the attributes that make us
legally relevant-and hence are the attributes to which we are
reduced for legal and policy purposes.
For example, suppose you advocate that we globally
maximize aggregate utility. In that case, you effectively are
suggesting that we distribute things in a way that enhances that
utility. You are also suggesting that those whose utility functions
figure into your global welfare function be counted as equals in a
particular respect-here, in respect of their utility functions.2 And
the respect in which you count these individuals as equals is the
identifying feature to which you assimilate or reduce them: If you are
strictly utilitarian, individuals are their utility functions so far as
your conception of global welfare is concerned.3 A person's utility
function is the sole attribute in virtue of which she "counts" in your
global welfare analysis.4
A concrete example:5 Say Beatrice and Benedict each have
enough resources to subsist upon. Say further that "global society"
distributed fairly or unfairly. Foundational errors of precisely this sort are among
those I hope to correct using the mode of analysis proposed in this Article. For
more on objects and patterns of distribution see infra Parts II.C, II.D.
2. Some utilitarians use this fact to justify their position on putatively
egalitarian grounds by claiming that everyone's utility function counts "for one"
in the global welfare function. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. This argument assumes each individual's utility function counts for
"one" in the global welfare function. See infra note 14. It is also possible to weight
different persons' utility functions differently-for example, counting the utility
functions of the handicapped or desperately ill for more, as some "prioritarian"
global welfare functions might do. In that case, the individual is globally
identified by her weighted utility function; the objectionability of the
identification will depend on the reasons for the differential weightings. For an
expanded discussion, see infra Part II.D.
4. This statement assumes that yours is an unalloyed, "strict" welfare
function. For in-depth analysis of "strict" and "mixed" functions, see infra Part
II.D.
5. We can also render it more abstract and formal. A summary rendition of
this kind is provided infra note 14.
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has at its disposal an additional three units of what I will call
"benefit stuff'-resources available to direct toward Beatrice and
Benedict.6 Say finally that Benedict derives marginally more utility
from benefit stuff than does Beatrice until he has received two units.7
Thereafter, Beatrice receives marginally more utility from benefit
stuff than does Benedict. If we are utilitarians and, accordingly, wish
to maximize feasible global utility under these circumstances, we will
give the first two available units of benefit to Benedict, and the final
available unit to Beatrice.
Call the benefits, prior to distribution, "generic benefit" units,
or "benefits" for short. Call the benefits, after they are distributed,
"aggregate-maximizing" units, or "maximizers" for short.' Then there
are three (even four) distinct ways to characterize what we have
done. 9 First, we could say we have maximized global utility. Second,
we could say we have distributed benefits unequally ex ante, two to
one in favor of Benedict. Third, we could say we have distributed
maximizers equally ex post over Beatrice and Benedict, and (perhaps
fourth) in that sense alone, we have treated Beatrice and Benedict as
equals. In sum, we have distributed benefits unequally in a manner
that treats Beatrice and Benedict as equals in respect of the utility
functions with which we identify them-but in no other respect.' In
doing so, we have maximized something believed by utilitarians to
exist: aggregate global utility.1"
The reason to recognize the connection between
maximization, distribution, equalization, and identification
formulations is this: Maximization language and formulae tend to
6. You can think of it as money if you like, or as some other resource
transformable into utility. See infra Part II.C.
7. I prescind here from worries about interpersonal comparability, as do
utilitarians themselves. See infra Part II.C.
8. They are characterized accordingly, not just in terms of their ex ante
material attributes, but in terms of their aggregate ex post utility effects when
distributed over a given population of individuals. That is to say, these effects are
"internal to" or "constitutive of' the things as thus individuated. Thank you to
Matt Adler and Jeff Rachlinski for pushing me to make this point more clearly. I
hope I have succeeded.
9. Three ways if we assimilate equalization into identification; four ways if
we treat them as distinct characterizations.
10. The "in no other respect" qualifier proves important for reasons that
emerge presently.
11. The existence in question often is contested, partly on measurability
grounds. See infra Part II.C. I refrain from posing such objections here.
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lead us toward framing all of our thoughts in terms of
maximization.'2 And speaking exclusively in such terms leads us to
thinking exclusively in those terms, as well. 3 We are accordingly apt
to lose sight of the fact that in maximizing we are also distributing,
and that in distributing we likewise are equalizing some things while
"disequalizing" other things over our fellow persons. Consequently,
we are apt to overlook the fact that we are reducing our fellow
persons to some single attribute of themselves-for example, their
utility functions-by exclusively maximizing it.14
Our tendency to cast global legal and policy inquiries
exclusively in maximizing terms is potentially problematic for a
variety of reasons. First, it is as individuals-as recipients of
distributions of various kinds-that our fellow persons engage our
12. They bear, to employ the increasingly popular idiom, "framing effects."
13. You likely know the word "maximandum" or its elliptical rendition,
"maximand." Do you know the words "equalisandum" and "equalisand?" They can
be found in the same dictionaries as their maximizing counterparts. See Robert
Hockett, Why Paretians Can't Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives
in Law and Economics, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming 2009) (working
paper at 15-16), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266270.
(stating that fair welfare is the appropriate form for legal prescription).
14. Here's a summary rendition of the point in formal terms: Maximization
imperatives typically are expressed as injunctions to "Max" the global aggregate
of social welfare, something called "W." This aggregate measure varies with the
net "utility" or "benefits" experienced by individuals, which is called "u." W is
accordingly, in the typical case, said to be a "function" of individuals' summed u-
measures. Hence W = W(ul, u2, u3,... um). The numeric subscripts index the u-
functions of the m individuals, and the imperative is to "Max W = E ui." Here,
the Greek letter sigma indicates that we are summing, and the "i" subscript
indicates that we are to count each individual i's u-measure in the sum. This
summing of course requires interpersonal comparability. See infra Part II.C.
Each individual's u-measure is typically viewed as a function of benefits
and burdens received or experienced by, hence distributed to, the individual. For
each individual i, ui = ui(bl, b2,... bn), meaning simply that the individual's u-
measure is a function of a vector (or "basket") of n distinct benefits and burdens.
(A positive function of the benefits, and a negative function of the burdens.
Comparative contributions and detractions made by distinct b's to the u-measure
of course imply commensurability, hence something like "price ratios," among the
b's. See infra Part II.C.) W is accordingly, in the final analysis, a composite
function W 0 ui 0 bj, or W(ui(bj)), meaning that W is a function of aggregated u-
measures, which are themselves functions of aggregated b-measures.
A quick formal way of putting the points made over the previous few
pages, then, is that maximizing W generally entails distributing b's to individuals
i, who are "counted" and treated as equals for policy purposes solely by virtue of
their u-functions.
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collective concern in the first place. Second, most of us wish to accord
one another equal concern of some appropriate type-a type keyed to
some politically appropriate conception of who or what we are-in
our distributive legal and policy decisions. Talking and thinking
exclusively in maximizing terms makes it harder to discern not only
whether we are distributing, equalizing, and individuating ourselves
by reference to the right things, but even whether we are maximizing
the right things.'5 The analytic linkage to which I am calling
attention runs in both directions: We maximize the right things only
when we distribute, equalize, and define one another by reference to
the right things.
6
15. Suppose, for example, we believe in equal opportunity to engage in the
production of wealth. Then what we believe ought to be maximized is not just
wealth, but wealth produced under conditions of equal opportunity. Call it "equal-
opportunity-grounded wealth." Call wealth not thus produced "opportunity-
indifferent wealth." Then to act as to maximize opportunity-indifferent wealth is
to maximize the wrong maximandum, in light of our commitment to equal
opportunity. It is best, then, to pay close attention to the linkages among all four
phenomena-maximization, distribution, equalization, and identification. That
way we enable ourselves to make use of the implications of competing proposed
laws and policies upon all four as checks upon one another. This ensures that we
are maximizing, distributing, equalizing, and identifying each other in respect of
the right things.
16. To see this more graphically, imagine a simple variation on the story of
Beatrice and Benedict considered above. Our society now aims to maximize
aggregate forehead height rather than utility. Assume Benedict's forehead is
higher than Beatrice's, that forehead height is genetically transmitted, and that
transmission correlates in straightforward linear fashion with resource
consumption. (That is, more resources improve the chances of genetic
transmission. Please ignore for present purposes such complications as
diminishing returns and any gendered determinants of forehead measures that
there might be.) Now in the name of maximizing aggregate forehead height, we
distribute all three available units of benefit stuff to Benedict. Maximization of
global forehead height, equal treatment of individuals with respect solely to
forehead heights, and disparate treatment of individuals in consequence of their
equal treatment with respect to their forehead heights, then, come to the same
here, just as before in the case of utility. The foreheadist might even offer the
utilitarian's own favored pseudo-egalitarian rejoinder to your cry of eugenics. He
says, "[B]ut we have counted each forehead only once!" See, e.g., John Harsanyi,
Putatively Egalitarian Justification of Utilitarianism in Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. Pol. Econ.
309, 320-21(1955) (arguing in favor of policies that maximize aggregate
individual utilities, Harsanyi proposes giving an individual's utility an equal
value of 1, and maximizing the total unweighted sum or average).
Monstrous, you say. Agreed. But why? Surely it is because it is
monstrous to identify a human being with her forehead height, which is precisely
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We would do well, then, to crack open our "maximization-
speak" and maximization formulae, in order to lay bare their
inherently distributive, equalizing, and ultimately individual-
characterizing internal structures. Moreover, I will suggest, we
would do well to do adopt a policy of addressing the maximization,
distribution, equalization, and individual-characterization
components of the inquiry in reverse order.7 It is critical to define
ourselves, for legal and policy purposes, before we attempt to evaluate
the forms of equalization, distribution and maximization wrought by
our law and policy.1 8 But none of this is fully transparent until we
what the maximizing "global forehead function" does. But is an individual any
more legitimately identified with her utility function than with her forehead? Are
you any more responsible for your endorphin count-the innate neuro-chemical
basis of your capacity to transform resources into utility-than you are for your
forehead height? Is that what your fellow persons should reduce you to being? I
think we will agree it is not. But this means we both disagree with utilitarianism,
as here-and as typically-construed. Yet we are not apt to immediately see this
when we think of the latter only in terms of what it maximizes, rather than also
in terms of what it distributes, what it equalizes, and, therefore, what it take us
for being. For who but the most churlish could be against "maximizing"
something so vaguely benign-sounding as "aggregate utility," when distracted
from fully considering what that means for each one of us as individuals and co-
persons?
We feel more immediately troubled by the forehead suggestion, I
suspect, because we think immediately of foreheads as individuals' attributes,
hence see immediately that "aggregate forehead maximization" is reducing
persons to no more than their foreheads. ("Head-counts" with a vengeance.)
"Utility," by contrast, tends more to strike us as a mysterious substance-widely
spread "good stuff"-that none but curmudgeons could fail to want there to be
more of. It is only upon reflecting that we see that this "utility" is produced
physiologically and that "maximizing" it therefore requires channeling resources
disproportionately to those with the utility-equivalent of high foreheads-steep
utility curves-that we see the moral equivalence. Hence the importance of those
forms of inter-translatability as between identification, equalization, and
maximization that I wish here to emphasize.
17. Thank you to Trevor Morrison for suggesting that I emphasize this
point.
18. Why? In short, because our principal care is with what we are and
whether we are treated accordingly. Plausible answers to the question "in what
respects we are properly regarded as equals" then proceed immediately from
answers to the identification question. Plausible answers to the question "What
ought to be distributed in what patterns and measures," in turn, proceed at once
from our answers to the equalization question. And thereafter, in turn, the
appropriate form of maximization takes care of itself: Distribute the right things
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open the internal structures of our maximization norms to systematic
inspection.
To examine the internal structure of maximization language
and maximization formulae is a way to "take distribution
seriously"-if I may join others in using this now familiar locution.1 9
I thus propose in this Article to lay out with care what it
might look like to take distribution seriously in normatively oriented
transnational legal and policy analysis.2 ° I aim to specify in detail
what I believe to be the conditions and the appropriately structured
mode of analysis, respectively, under which normative global
distributional assessment is called for and apt to bear fruit. The key
is to focus on something that I have referred to a few times already-
what I call "distributive structure." That structure is manifest not
only in all fully analyzed global welfare functions, as suggested above
and as shown in more detail below, but also in the grammar of less
formal distributive language itself. I shall accordingly be attending to
both.
to the right people in the right measures, and you will have maximized that
which it makes sense to maximize. This point is illustrated infra Part II.D.
Note also that many of those who seem most wedded to maximization
formulae seem ironically, if nevertheless unwittingly, to be logically committed to
precisely this claim. The so-called "individualist" global welfare functions they
champion misunderstand that it is by reference to the individuals who constitute
it that a society fares well. Where the articulation peters out for these people is at
the point where we note that there are many different respects in virtue of which
individuals can be individuated for legal and policy purposes, some of which are
normatively arbitrary and others of which are not. See infra Part II.C. The term
"individualism," as used in connection with global welfare functions, appears to
originate with Samuelson, supra note 1.
19. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977). See also
George A. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Union and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Michael Bratman,
Taking Plans Seriously, 9 Soc. Theory & Prac. 271 (1983); Richard Crasswell,
Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Disclosure in Contract Law
and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565 (2006); Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously, 23 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 45 (2000). More waggish forays include William E. Forbath, Taking Lefts
Seriously, 92 Yale L.J. 1041 (1983); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An
Essay for Centrists, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1829 (1986); and David A. J. Richards, Taking
Rights Seriously, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265 (1977).
20. And hence, among other things, what an ethically intelligible welfare
or economic analysis of law might look like. See infra Part III.
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The remainder of the Article, then, proceeds as follows: Part I
preliminarily characterizes the conditions that call for normative
distributional assessment. These are the circumstances under which
"who holds what" can and must be evaluated as "right," "wrong,"
"better," or "worse." Though these conditions are foundational and
ought to be evident, their brief enumeration serves both to ground
and clarify the more detailed discussion that follows.
Part II then systematically examines five classes of questions
that arise when making most legal and policy decisions, be they
global or local. These classes of question jointly constitute what I am
calling "distributive structure." They also prove neatly tractable by
reference to what linguists will recognize as the "cognitive grammar"
of "to distribute" and cognate infinitives-verbs like "to allocate," "to
apportion," "to mete out," etc.2' The gaps opened up by this grammar,
deciding those who distribute, those to whom they distribute, what
they distribute, per what pattern and by what means they
distribute-afford a helpful starting point in discovering the full
range of questions that distribution policy invariably implicates. And
it is precisely this attention that I believe we must employ if we are
to avoid "framing-blindspots" of the kind over which I have been
raising red flags.22
It turns out that the selection of particular values to fill one
or more variables discussed above tends to constrain ways in which
we can fill the others. At least this is true of core values that we
appear to share concerning what we are, what we most care about,
what we are responsible for, what in consequence is fair, and thus
what we implicitly acknowledge that we owe one another. Plausible
21. For an extensive discussion on this grammar, see infra Part II. It
should not be surprising, upon reflection, that the structure of distribution would
be mirrored in the language we use to communicate about it.
22. One might draw an analogy here to the general equilibrium analysis
favored by more sophisticated economic theorists. The founding idea in both that
case and this is that when items figuring into analysis are interdependent and in
that sense constitute a system, the system itself is the appropriate unit of
analysis. In the present case, the system in question is the set of variables carried
by "to distribute" and cognate infinitives, all of which must be filled before a
distributive claim can be determinate, and each of which must be filled in a
manner compatible with the manners in which the others are filled.
23. Insofar as we think of the recipients of distributions as responsible
agents, for example, it strikes us as more sensible to think of that which we ought
to distribute as resources rather than utility, since responsible agents "produce"
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conceptions of appropriate distribution turn out to be rather like
locations along an isoquant-a fair allocation "indifference curve," to
put the point metaphorically.24
The discussion over Parts I and II accordingly converges
upon what seems to be our logically entailed consensus
understanding of the correct global allocation "isoquant." This is, in
short, the distributional template, or the conception of global justice,
grounded in our core value commitments, and systematized via the
distributional theory, that structures our analysis. It is our vision
for the way global distribution should proceed, given our broadly
shared conception of ourselves as fundamentally equal rights-
endowed, boundedly responsible forgers of good, well-faring lives out
of scarce material opportunity.
their own utility out of the resources they are given. It is interlinkages of this sort
that I have in mind here, and that I map throughout Part II.
Let me, while at it here, preemptively add that in employing the first
person plural I make claims that are corroborated in two ways. First, I anticipate
that the reader, on reflection, will agree that the value commitments to which I
refer are indeed her own. Second, and perhaps more helpfully, in Part III shall
cite empirical evidence from the behavioral economics and sociological literatures
indicating that these values are indeed widely shared, irrespective of partisan
political identification. See, e.g., Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer,
Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory (1993) (arguing
that an empirical methodology should be applied to define universal concepts of
fairness and distributive justice); John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, The Handbook
of Experimental Economics (1995) (discussing the many experimental
methodologies that can be used to evaluate decision making and values); Tom R.
Tyler et al., Social Justice in a Diverse Society (1997) (explaining that concerns
for social justice are robust across cultures).
24. An isoquant is simply a curve, different locations along which all take
the same value in some formal inquiry. Probably the most familiar isoquants are
the indifference curves endemic to microeconomic analysis. Changing x-
coordinates along the same curve are said to be "compensated for" by changing y-
coordinates, such that points corresponding to ordered pairs (interpreted, say, as
"commodity bundles") are at home on the same curve and thus correspond to the
same "utility" enjoyed by a consumer. If we think of normatively appropriate
distributions of benefits and burdens as isoquant curves, we will see that here we
are able to remain on the same "curve" by changing characterizations of what we
distribute, for example, in response to changing characterizations of the pattern
pursuant to which we distribute it. See infra Part II.D.
25. I refer to the upshot of Part II's grammatically-structured analysis as
"meta-theoretic" because it involves explication of the structure of all complete
theories of appropriate distribution-a structure that is manifest in the cognitive
grammar of "to distribute" and cognate infinitives.
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Part III shows how readily the Part II-derived conception of
appropriate distribution (hence identification, equalization, and
maximization) lends itself to practical implementation, in light of our
current legal and institutional environment. Indeed, this Part shows,
the correct conception of appropriate distribution looks to be much
more readily realizable than are its chief competitors, including
welfare and wealth maximizing views, and "maximining" Rawlsian
justice theory. Moreover, many of our legal principles prove best
interpreted as aimed at vindicating the distributive ethic upon which
the lines of Part II all converge. That bears obvious practical
consequences for legal interpretation on the bench as well as for
future law-making in the legislatures of the globe. It also bears
critical theoretic consequences for those who debate the comparative
merits of "law and economics," "welfarism," "Rawlsianism," and
competing normative approaches to transnational law and legal
theory.
Not surprisingly, then, I conclude the Article with some
suggestions as to its implications for future transnational legal and
policy analysis, based upon a distributive framework that makes
normative sense.
I. DISTRIBUTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Most things we find in the world are in some sense
distributed, allocated, meted or spread out, etc. Not all such spreads
lend themselves to intelligible normative critique. The chairs and the
table in your kitchen are laid out in a certain arrangement. They are
"distributed" over the floor in some geometrically specifiable pattern,
and could be redistributed over that surface in many alternative
ways. Absent some purpose or value in such arrangements, however,
there is no reason to say it "should" be changed.
It also happens that many distributions of things do
implicate values and purposes, some of them pressing or urgent.
Such distributions accordingly fall subject to one or another mode of
normative assessment. Insofar as you are sensitive to considerations
of "feng shui" or geomancy, for example, even the spread of your
furniture will lend itself to a form of normative evaluation. Some
arrangements will aesthetically dominate others, such that you
might incline toward redistributing your furniture until it accords
with the "best" possible arrangement. Additional values may
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influence how one evaluates the arrangement-ease of reading in the
late afternoon light, for example.
Domestic and international legal arrangements and public
policies have the effect of distributing not simply tables and chairs
over floors, but perceived goods and ills over persons. Evaluation
accordingly strikes us as more pressing in these cases. Legal rules
and rulings, statutory enactments, treaties, and government
programs and policies of various sorts all tend to yield "winners" and
"losers," the recipients of benefits and burdens.
Patterns of such policy-wrought wins and losses amount,
relative to each status quo ante they displace, to redistributions of
perceived goods and ills. These redistributions, like each
arrangement they supplant, are subject to normative critique as
readily as are furniture arrangements.
Less obvious to some legal and policy analysts, however, is
that even when allocations wrought by legal rules and policies are
neither foreseen nor intended, they remain ethically assessable: once
brought to attention, they are subject to claims which allege such
arrangements are "right," "wrong," "better," or "worse," and are
therefore to be improved or deliberately left in place accordingly. In
this light we are well advised to take at least summary stock of the
circumstances under which distributive consequences can be said to
be ethically better or worse. The set is small, but important. Fuller
detail will build on the present foundations as we turn to the
distributive-ethical assessment's full logical form in Part II.
First, there must of course be things that can be variably
distributed, also known as "distribuenda." Second, there must be
beings to whom these things can be distributed, or "distribuees."
Third, those to whom the things can be distributed must hold
preferences or interests in respect of their receiving or not receiving
them. These items must be regarded or are properly regardable as
beneficial or burdensome by their prospective recipients.
Fourth, the recipients of items, who hold preferences or
interests in respect of the same, must hold legal or ethical claims to
our regard. In other words, they must be entitled to our consideration
of their preferences or interests as we distribute. And we must
reciprocally consider the claimants' preferences or interests. It is this
entitlement and its correlative obligation that render our assessment
of distributions to the preferences of interest-holders normative, or
ethical, in nature.
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This fourth condition is apt to create the most controversy, as
it necessitates finding some distributive claims "ethnically
cognizable," or deserving of a legal cause of action. And typically, the
class of ethical claimants whom we consider entitled to our regard is
smaller than the class of those who might literally claim. There are
sentient creatures who presumably want things, or to be free of
things, whom not everyone agrees deserve rights to have those wants
considered.26 We will consider this matter more fully below, in II.B.
For now it suffices simply to have marked the potential, and to have
characterized the legally relevant distributive terrain.
Finally fifth, all items the distribution of which would be
subject to ethical assessment must be "scarce." There must be
potential for interests or preferences to diverge or conflict. With a
finite number of benefits, distributions of all of them to a subclass of
individuals will necessarily disadvantage the other classes. This
prerequisite, combined with the previous one, entails a need for
adjudication. We require both principled and practical means of
balancing distribuees' potentially conflicting rights against one
another.
II. DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE
Distribution is internally complex. It bears a structure, a
logical form. Its form, unsurprisingly, is tracked by the form of the
infinitives that name it. What linguists call the "case," "cognitive" or
"valence" grammar of infinitives (like "to distribute") shows the
structure to which distribution itself always conforms. 27 The same
26. There are non-persons, for example, who seek some of what persons
seek. Unborn fetuses might in some sense "prefer" to be permitted to reach full
term. Among unambiguously non-human beings, in turn, bovines, pork, fish, and
fowl presumably do not wish to be killed and eaten. At any rate, they often seek
to avoid the violent prerequisites to their being eaten. See infra, Parts II.A, II.B.
27. Case, cognitive, or valence grammars divide sentences into predicate
functions-typically verbs-and their argument places. Most of the latter are
then filled by nouns and noun phrases, but in some cases they are filled by
adverbs-predicates of predicates, hence second-order predicates. The number
and kinds of arguments that a predicate can take constitute its "valency." See
generally Charles J. Fillmore, The Case for Case, in Universals in Linguistic
Theory 1-88 (Emmon Bach & Robert T. Harms eds., 1968) (stating that the
grammatical notion of case is a base component of the grammar of every
language); Charles J. Fillmore, Toward a Modern Theory of Case, in Modern
Studies in English 361-75 (David A. Reibel & Sanford A. Schane eds., 1969)
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grammar accordingly should be attended to by normative
distributional assessment if the latter is to be both complete and
intelligible.
Call a claim concerning the rightness or wrongness,
betterness or worseness of some law- or policy-wrought distribution a
"distributive claim." For such a claim to be complete, hence
determinate, it must fill all the gaps opened by the case grammar of
"to distribute." The variables are, in effect, the pronouns and
proadverbs that figure into the following questions: Who is being
addressed by the distributive claim? What does the claim take for
being distributed, or suppose ought to be distributed? To whom does
it take that for being distributed, or suppose that it ought to be
distributed? What pattern does the claim take properly to
characterize permissible distributions to such recipients? And how-
by what physical means-does the claim take the distribution to be
effectuable?
28
(explaining that at the deep structure level, each sentence in a language consists
of a verb and a collection of nouns in various cases); Studies in Linguistic
Semantics (Charles J. Fillmore & D. Terence Langendoen eds., 1971) (seeking to
develop an adequate linguistic account of semantics). The analysis of predicates
as argument-taking functions appears to have originated with Frege. See Gottlob
Frege, Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled on that of arithmetic, for pure
thought, in From Frege to Gidel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-
1931 5-82 (Jan van Heijenoort ed., 1967) (proposing that "[a] judgment is
obtained when the argument places between the parentheses attached to a
functional letter have been properly filledH"); Gottlob Frege, Function and
Concept, in The Frege Reader 130-48 (Michael Beaney ed., 1997) (offering that
"[t]he argument does not belong with a function, but goes with the function to
make up a complete whole[]").
28. In effect I supplement pure semantics-based case grammar here with
argument-places additionally derived from linguistic pragmatics. For a claim
actually to be made rather than simply entertained propositionally, it must be
addressed to someone, and must take into account means by which addressees
can effectively respond to it. In making this observation I am melding classical
valence grammar with what Paul Grice would have called "conversational
implicature." See, e.g., H. Paul Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in
9 Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics 113-27 (Peter Cole ed., 1978) (arguing that
"implicatures" carry presuppositions that the listener must identify.); H. Paul
Grice, Presupposition and Conversational Implicature, in Radical Pragmatics
183-98 (Peter Cole ed., 1981) (outlining "[an exposition of the thesis that the
existential presuppositions seemingly carried by definite descriptions can be
represented within a Russellian semantics, with the aid of a standard attachment
of conversational implicature []").
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The values with which "complete" claims fill these variables
include the vocabulary discussed in Part I supra: distributors,
distribuenda, distribuees, distribution formulae, and distribution
mechanisms. The middle three variables must be filled for a
distributive-ethical claim to be semantically complete-i.e., for the
claim to bear determinate cognitive content in respect of whether a
successfully individuated and characterized spread of goods or ills
over persons is or would be right, wrong, better, or worse than some
other conceivable spread. The first and last variables must be filled
for the claim to be what might be called "pragmatically" complete-
i.e., for the claim successfully to prescribe some possible course of
action that might actually be taken. 9
Opposing sides of overt or implicit distributive disputes, then,
are effectively disagreeing over how one or more of the enumerated
variables should be filled. The fact that such disputes are often
implicit affords us one reason to bring the variables more explicitly
into the foreground to clarify what, if anything, is really in dispute.
But there is another reason for attending explicitly to the variables
and, thereby, to the internal structure of distribution that they
jointly constitute: it is that most of us by far, I believe, actually agree
about how the variables ought to be filled when we assess them
directly.
These claims can most effectively be shown, I believe, by
elaborating and critiquing the leading variables that have been
proposed. While some of these will look at least passingly familiar,
they have not yet been considered together, in relation to each other
at once. It is precisely this lack of systematic treatment, I believe,
that renders the obscurity I lamented in the Introduction-confusion
as to the relations among distribution, equalization, self-
identification, and maximization.
In an important sense, then, the argument that follows is
cumulative: No one point will be fully appreciable until all points are
made. But one has to start somewhere, and one can make piecemeal
points at least provisionally appreciable. I will treat both the
variables and candidates for filling them in sequence, doing my best
to look ahead and/or backward to other variables while proceeding.
29. Semantic completeness is necessary, but does not suffice, to confer
pragmatic completeness.
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A. Distributors
Domestic and transnational law and policy, we have
observed, typically bear distributive consequences. That means that
those who enact and then act upon law and policy effectively
distribute benefits and burdens. In a derivative sense, those who
evaluate law and policy distribute these same things as well. In the
act of assessing or evaluating laws and policies bearing distributive
consequences, one prescribes in respect of those consequences, and
says, in effect, how she would distribute them. Another way of
illustrating the point is to say that distribution, like "to distribute"
and other infinitives that name it, always takes some singular or
collective subject: There must be distributors-those who distribute,
or who prescribe or determine how distribution ought to or is to
proceed.
Who we understand the distributors to be will tend to play
some role in determining our ethically distributive norms. The
converse, of course, also holds: particular duties and those whom we
take to be subject to such duties must categorically "fit" one another.
Who, then, are they whom we take to owe each of us the benefit of
acting in conformity with our distributive "ought" claims?
That question is probably the easiest that we will have to
address in this Article. For there seems to be little disagreement over
who the effective distributors are in most modern legal and policy
settings, at least in modern democratic polities. "We"-the sovereign
we, all who are addressed by legal and policy arguments over
distributive propriety-are in effect taken to be the distributors.
We are "the people," the citizenry or humanity at large, who
bear rights to take part in deciding what is distributively right. Or
we are "the global or local policy community," the judges, legislators,
advocates, diplomats, analysts, academics and others assumed to be
thinking and acting on behalf of that broader constituency. The latter
constituency, in such case, includes ourselves as its proxies or
representative members. In either case, then, we are effectively
distributing over ourselves so far as legal and policy debate is
concerned. Interestingly, then, the class of distributors, particularly
in modem polities, typically converges with that of distribuees-the
next variable that we shall address.
Were we gods or, perhaps somewhat more humbly, elites
looking over a polity in which rights were allotted unequally in our
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favor, there might be some wedge between "us" and the distribuees:
We would be considering what "we" should distribute to "them,"
pursuant to what patterns and means.30 This disparity between
would-be distributors and would-be distribuees characterizes
discourse about animal rights, for example. 31 But the "we" and the
"they" of most mainstream distributive discourse are one and the
same in the sense that we are speaking of how we should apportion
goods and ills among ourselves. How, then, should we characterize
ourselves when considering what is to be distributed, and pursuant to
what patterns and means?
B. Distribuees
Distribution, like "to distribute" and other infinitives that
denote it, takes-or, "opens a grammatical space for"-not only
subjects, but indirect objects as well. Where there are distributions,
there are also distribuees, or those to whom things are distributed.
Just as there must be "fit" between our distributive-ethical norms
and how we characterize distributors, moreover, so must there be fit
between those norms and how we characterize the distribuees whose
rights those norms vindicate. How, then, do we or should we construe
the recipients of distributed benefits and burdens? How should we
characterize or identify them, and what should we take them to be?
The fact that we are distributors, and accordingly responsible
for the distribution decisions ultimately made, says something
important about us as distribuees. Curiously, however, not everyone
seems to have caught the hint. Many legal and policy theorists and
analysts, via positions they take as to how we should characterize
distribuenda and distribution formulae as discussed below,
effectively commit themselves to a view of distribuees that conflicts
with the view that their likewise being distributors would seem to
entail. It is tempting to hope we might end this conflict simply by
30. Some theorists view "analysts" as radically distinct from the citizenry
at large. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 382-402.
31. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 5-9 (1976) (discussing how
humans ("we," the distributors) should distribute rights and considerations to
animals ("them," the distribuees)). A not entirely dissimilar disparity as between
distributors and distribuees is of course encountered in debate over the ethics of
abortion, though in this case a critical feature of the dispute is precisely the issue
of whether the distribuees are members of the distributor class. That is one
reason why this dispute is more contentious than that over animal rights.
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bringing it to light. First, then, this Article will examine the
gradually emerging consensus view of distribuees-the one on which
most seem to agree when the question of how to construe them is
posed directly. Then we shall turn to the view that is implicitly held,
only when analysts fail to examine the assumptions underlying their
proferred distribuenda and distribution formulae.
1. Responsible Agents
The gradually emergent consensus view of distribuees among
those who concern themselves explicitly with the ethics of
distribution is in harmony with their simultaneous role as the
distributors. It is the view according to which distribuees are best
considered what I shall call "boundedly responsible agents."3 2
Boundedly responsible agents largely, though not completely,
determine their own well-being. It is accordingly appropriate to hold
them responsible, in some measure, for doing so. Not to do so is
inconsistent with our according distribuees-and our according one
another-appropriate respect as freely choosing, morally autonomous
human beings. But boundedly responsible agents also are
constrained, to a not fully determinable degree, in effecting their
welfare by the environments into which they are born. That is what
"boundedness" means in this context. Our inherited capacities,
incapacities, advantages, and disadvantages-themselves features of
our environments-permit us wide, and yet nevertheless limited,
latitude in altering or exiting our environments.
This construal of ourselves coheres not only with our role as
distributors, but also with our own experiences. We experience
ourselves and others both as freely choosing and as also constrained
to a vaguely determinable degree in the choosing. That experience is
reflected in our capacities to experience guilt, shame, ambition for
and frustration with self, resentment of and gratitude to others. It is
also reflected in the "reactive attitudes" we often experience,
attitudes which are intelligible only under conditions of relative
freedom.33 The same appreciation of "boundedness," moreover,
32. I note infra Part II.B.2 that Dworkin and some others emphasize
agents by emphasizing responsibility.
33. Notice of the link between responsibility and "reactive attitudes" bears
a venerable pedigree. See Peter F. Strawson, Freedom & Resentment, in Free Will
59-80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982) (illustrating that we must believe others have
some control over themselves for us to have a genuine reaction to their behavior);
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underwrites our capacities to feel and extend mercy, forgiveness,
sympathetic understanding, and charity toward self and toward
others.
The construal of distribuees as boundedly responsible agents
carries a cluster of interlinked consequences for normative
distributional assessment: First, to the degree that we view
distribuees as freely choosing, we find it appropriate to hold them
responsible in part for what they choose, hence to live with the
consequences of many of their choices. This is not merely a matter of
punitive attitude, nor even of incentives-sensitive productive
efficiency, though of course such considerations can sensibly
underwrite the view. It is, more compellingly, a matter of human
dignity and respect. It is part of what it is to view persons as
agents-as practical forgers of fate-rather than the mere passive
objects of fate, akin to children who "do not know any better" or
"could not help it."3 4
Second, an often ignored corollary of this form of respect is
the imperative that all agents be viewed as equally dignified and
equally deserving of most forms of respect.35 As observed in the
Introduction, with a conception of who we are comes a conception of
the features in virtue of which we are "morally" equal for legal and
policy purposes. With the latter comes a conception of what ought to
be distributed, and in what measure.
Another consequence that stems from the view of distribuees
as boundedly responsible agents, then, is a commitment to
conceptions of appropriate distribuenda, distribution formulae, and
see also Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in
Philosophy and Politics, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299, 299-323 (1992) (arguing that
resistance to a diminished conception of responsibility fuels opposition to the
liberal agenda).
34. It is tempting to suppose that some such commitment is what
ultimately underwrites the Kantian idea of a "right to punishment." See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution,
Retribution and the Legal Process (1977), http://www.randybarnett.com/
assessing-thecriminal_.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (explaining that the
current criminal system overcomplicates the crime problem as it is unable to
choose between conflicting goals and rationales to achieve swift, predictable, and
just results); Patricia S. Greenspan, Responsible Psychopaths, http://www.
philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/rp.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2009)
(setting forth a philosophical view that separate ideas of freedom and
responsibility would make better sense of psychopaths).
35. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can't Prescribe, supra note 13.
HeinOnline -- 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 362 2008-2009
2009] DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 363
distribution mechanisms that permit and give latitude to the
operation of responsible agency. Appropriate distribuenda will be
conceived as ex ante inputs to individual welfare or utility functions.
The resulting "outputs," however, are in significant measure the
responsibility of distribuees themselves. Appropriate distribution
formulae, for their part, will speak to the ex ante distribution of
inputs that operate independently of an individual's responsibility
and initiative. The formulae will not be directly concerned with ex
post, responsibility-dependent welfare outcomes. These will instead
be treated as byproducts, mediated and influenced by distribuees'
responsible agency. Preferred distribution mechanisms, in turn, will
accordingly be those that give most effective expression to these
ideals. We will see this borne out below.
2. Patients & Addicts
The circumstances that bind individuals to certain situations
can usefully be called "patienthood."36 To the degree that one really
"cannot help himself," he is a patient, or an object of fate. He is acted
upon rather than acting himself. Conversely, he is an addict- one
who quite literally "cannot resist."
To the degree that our agency is bounded, we are all patients.
But we are not generally apt to admit this. Indeed, we are apt to feel
disgust or contempt, rooted perhaps in the perceived threat that is
posed by role-models with whom we subconsciously but reluctantly
identify. Owing to that fact, along with the indeterminacy of the
boundary between choice and chance in the many borderline cases
each of us experiences each day, we tend generally to let the
boundary "take care of itself." We do so simply by trying as hard as
36. I intend "patient" as used here, like "agent" before, in its grammatical
sense-as the recipient rather than the initiator of an action. See, e.g., Bernard
Comrie, 2 Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology
42-43, 58-61 (1989) (differentiating between the agent (giver) and patient
(recipient)); John Lyons, An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics 340, 350
(1967) (defining "patient" as the "goal," or recipient of an action, as opposed to the
"agent" as an "actor"); see also Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory
and Practice of Equality 303 (2000) (referring to patients as "addicts," or ones
that cannot resist); Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There
Be?, 112 Yale L.J. 2291, 2295 (2003) (explaining that one may view people as
"agents, who act upon the world in ways for which they are responsible, and
patients, on whom the world acts in ways they cannot control").
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we can, then forgiving ourselves once we finally "let go" when we
must.
Doubtless for reasons that are rooted in these ideals, as well
as related concerns with incentives,3 7 few, if any, legal or policy
analysts wittingly construe distribuees as patients. Instead, they
effectively commit themselves to that construal. They do so via the
positions they take in respect of appropriate distribuenda,
distribution formulae, and distribution mechanisms-positions
whose logical consequences are often unappreciated.
Because welfare or "utility" draws attention to outputs rather
than inputs, for example, it is difficult to be unambiguously welfarist
or utilitarian without effectively treating distribuees as not being
responsible for outcomes, and hence as patients.8 Similarly, because
resources and wealth are readily viewed as welfare inputs, advocates
of ex post wealth distribution, even apart from the working of
distribuees' responsible choices, likewise treat distribuees effectively
as patients.39
Finally, insofar as any distribution mechanism fully
manifests a distribution principle such as that just mentioned, it too
treats distribuees as mere patients. 40 Insofar as it fails to be
egalitarian prior to or apart from the operation of distribuees'
responsible choices, by the same token, it violates ethical equality
and respect for agency. It does so by effectively treating some
distribuees as deserving of less than others even before these
individuals have opportunity to act to increase their material
opportunity.
C. Distribuenda
Distribution and its infinitives take, in addition to the
subjects and indirect objects that implicate distributors and
37. Those incentives and their consequences are traced infra. In brief,
letting agents too readily "off the hook" results in the unjustifiable conscription of
those who act responsibly by those who do not. It also, and equivalently, results
in ethically cognizable inefficiency.
38. See infra, Parts II.C, II.D.
39. See infra, Parts II.C, II.D.
40. This prospect of course suggests that distribution mechanisms might be
composite in nature: Market allocations followed by taxation and redistribution
would constitute a familiar case in point. The suggestion is borne out infra Part
III.
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distribuees, direct objects as well. There are always distribuenda, or
distributed things.
There has generally been more overt dispute in the
theoretical literature over appropriate distribuenda than over who or
what the distributors and distribuees are.4' This is likely the product
of what I detailed above-our failure thus far to think through the
linkages among all of distribution's constitutive variables. One
consequence is that alternative proposed distribuenda turn out to be
ethical touchstones. They serve as flags under which other
disputes--disputes over distribuees and distribution formulae in
particular-are pursued.
1. Welfare/Well-Being
A particularly venerable family of proffered distribuenda
have gone by such names as "utility," "welfare," "well-being,"
"happiness," "satisfaction" and cognate expressions.42 Although
authors construe the terms differently, they all share distinct family
resemblances rooted in one guiding idea. 43 The latter runs thus:
faring well is what matters to people. Indeed this is trivially so, in
view of the meanings of words such as "good" and its adverbial form,
"well," themselves. Terms such as "utility," "satisfaction,"
"happiness," and the like are often even defined simply as being
whatever is effectively "produced" by people's preferences (or on some
readings, their interests---"enlightened," "rational," "ideally
informed," or otherwise) being satisfied.44 This line of thinking
concludes that law and policy should aim at enhancing these
magnitudes-to do so is simply to satisfy people.
41. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 12-15, 22-23 (1993)
(discussing liberty and equality as prime examples, focusing on the debate over
what to distribute rather than to whom); Dworkin, supra note 36, at 111-19;
Gerald A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities, in The
Quality of Life 23 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (focusing on the
distribution of goods and welfare themselves rather than their distributors).
42. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. Phil. 463
(1979) (developing several models of proffered distribuenda, including utility and
welfare theories). For an exhaustive discussion of the concepts of welfare and
well-being, as well as of various conceptions of these, see James Griffin, Well-
Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (1986) (establishing
strong links between well-being, utility, and fulfillment of strong desires).
43. See Sen, supra note 42; see also Griffin, supra note 42.
44. See Sen, supra note 42; see also Griffin, supra note 42.
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Note that nothing as yet is implied here as to what such
"enhancing" or "satisfying" would look like. Things remain pitched at
a high level of abstraction. One might then wonder why anyone
would propose anything other than welfare as distribuendum. I think
what is objected to is not welfare as an abstract normative
distributional touchstone. Rather, what people protest is either: (a)
"welfare" as construed, by some of its more eccentric or irresponsible
advocates; relatedly (b) welfare as mere output that is aggregated
and globally "maximized," without regard to the way in which it is
produced; or (c) welfare as literal, direct distribuendum.45
Construal-based objections take various forms. Most are
prompted by unduly narrow or bizarrely overbroad stipulations by
advocates as to what should count as well-faring.46 Some early
utilitarians, including Bentham and Edgeworth, sometimes
suggested that all that should "count" as well- or ill-faring was
hedonic experience.47  Bentham named his rendition of this
commitment the "Pleasure Principle." Edgeworth, for his part,
predicted that one day a "hedonimeter" would be developed, with
which we would measure utility as readily as temperature. 48 Ramsey
and von Neumann made similar suggestions.49 It is even now often
suggested that utility and disutility are reducible to endorphins and
C-fiber counts, respectively, as "water" has come to be specified with
definitive precision as H20.
50
Suggestions like these prompt predictable objections and
equally predictable responsive refinements. Best known among the
latter are those of such thinkers as Mill, Sidgwick, and Griffin. These
45. This is an objection of my own. One cannot directly distribute welfare,
but must distribute something else that is thought to yield welfare.
46. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (1823) (noting that pain and pleasure govern mankind, and that
utility, expressed broadly, is an object that produces happiness or pleasure);
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application
of Mathematics (1881) (establishing analogies between principles of utility and
happiness with principles of physics and mathematics devoted to maximum
energy theory).
47. See Bentham, supra note 46; Edgeworth, supra note 46.
48. Edgeworth, supra note 46, at 101.
49. See, e.g., John von Neumann & Oscar Morgenstern, The Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior (1947).
50. See, e.g., John E. Roemer, Egalitarian Perspectives 117 (1994)
(explaining that in certain environments, differences between the utility of two
actors may be reducible to a difference in their endorphin levels).
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thinkers have sought to take seriously the prospect that a well-faring
human life might be something more than an extended orgasm or
itch-scratching." They nevertheless tend to treat the refined form of
welfare as a mysterious sort of substance, the aggregate quantum of
which ought to be maximized, at least until their conceptions grow so
refined as no longer to lend themselves to scalar aggregationY
Latterday exponents of the earlier Benthamite crudity do not
banish all welfare that is not "hedonic" in nature. They push instead
to the other extreme, counting as ethically cognizable "welfare" the
satisfaction of any preference whatsoever. 53 And so, they have
occasioned predictable objections, as well as refinements reminiscent
of those put forth by Griffin.54 Objections in this case take account of
the fact that a preference can itself be ethically problematic, either in
its own terms-because, say, it is a preference to be unethical-or as
the product of, hence as endogenous to, antecedent distributive
circumstances that are themselves ethically objectionable.55
51. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 42. Griffin's refinements have turned out
to be so extensive that he has ultimately found himself compelled to abandon
consequentialist ethics altogether. See James Griffin, The Human Good and the
Ambitions of Consequentialism, 9 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 18 (1992).
52. That is, at least until they view the determinants of welfare as being
too complex to be reduced to a single metric. See Griffin, The Human Good, supra
note 51.
53. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 421-22 (noting that "[tihe
idea of an analyst substituting his or her own conception of what individuals
should value for the actual views of the individuals themselves conflicts with
individuals' basic autonomy and freedom"). The short answer is that
imprisonment, too, "conflicts" with basic autonomy and freedom-that of convicts.
Few, if any, disapprove of autonomy and freedom, just as few disapprove of
welfare or well-being. But the question has always been how we are to demarcate
individuals' legitimate spheres of autonomy satisfactorily, and that question of
satisfactory demarcation is part of the question of fair allocation. See infra Part
II.D. The "we do not want to judge" disclaimer accordingly avails nothing.
Determining fair allocation is judging period. All law and policy require such
determinations. Use of the ethically loaded terms "welfare" or "well-being" rather
than less deck-stacking terms such as "preference-satisfaction," moreover,
registers precisely such judgment.
54. See Griffin, The Human Good, supra note 51, at 14.
55. For more information on the preference to be unethical (or those
preferences that will not be maximized under any social welfare system), see
Robert Hockett, Reflective Intensions: Two Foundational Decision-Points in
Mathematics, Law, and Economics, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1967, 2094 (2008)
(arguing that general jurisprudence and welfare economic theory can be
illuminated by "intentional" or "criterial" choice and "self-reference," which are
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It is deeply incoherent, for example, to say of the thief that
"he fares well," or that "his well-being improves," when he succeeds
in stealing more goods.56 For the thief is by definition the person who
violates distributive norms in conformity to which "good" and "well"
must themselves be defined.57 To call the thiefs satisfaction "welfare"
rather than "satisfaction" is to conflate desire with desert. It is
therefore to lose the distinction between description and prescription,
positive and normative, "is" and "ought." It is accordingly to
relinquish the capacity to prescribe or evaluate at all, hence to
abandon normative legal or policy analysis itself5 8
It would seem likewise, if less starkly misleading, to say of
the slave who has come to accept what she's told of her putative race-
rooted "inferiority," that she is "better off," or that "her welfare
improves," relative to some alternative circumstance in which she
rejects her race-rooted identification and demands respect.5 9 It can be
conceded that because, unlike the thief, she is presumed faultless, we
are able to view her having come to terms with her situation as
affording some good in mitigating her otherwise bad lot. But to say
that her "welfare" is improved in this way is nevertheless misleading
for its failure to register the wrongfulness of the circumstance that
renders her resignation consoling. If we are to maintain the
distinction between positive and normative with precision, then, it is
mathematical theoretical concepts that clarify our assumptions and possible
solutions to problems of freedom and just distribution). For more on preferences
that are endogenous to unfair antecedent distributive circumstances, see, e.g.,
Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 307-30 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) (rejecting utilitarian equality,
total utility equality, and Rawlsian equality to argue instead for "basic capability
equality," a theory of equality that prioritizes a person's ability to do certain basic
things); Gerald A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906,
922-23 (1989) (exploring a range of views on egalitarianism and values that
compete with distributive equality, arguing for a wider, access-oriented
egalitarianism).
56. Or that Nazis are "better off' when they murder more "non-Aryans,"
etc.
57. See Hockett, Prescriptive Paretian, supra note 1; see also Hockett, Why
Paretians Can't Prescribe, supra note 13.
58. See Hockett, Prescriptive Paretian, supra note 1; see also Hockett, Why
Paretians Can't Prescribe, supra note 13.
59. Even if the respect is not forthcoming. But see Arthur Schopenhauer,
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1844) (recommending, in Vol. I, Bk. 4,
Vedantic resignation).
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again more accurate in these "tamed housewife" cases6 ° to say "she's
resigned to her unjust circumstances" than that "her welfare is
higher."
Additional objections to welfare as distribuendum are rooted
in the fact that welfare is not a directly measurable or distributable
substance.6' The physical distribution problem is the most
immediately apparent. Whether understood as endorphins,
preference-satisfactions, idealized satisfactions, etc., welfare is
simply not something directly doled out. It is, rather, at best
"produced" by distribuees, from physical things that are doled out.
That opens two lines of concern flagged by theorists who do not
consider themselves unalloyed welfarists.
First, in order practically to be welfarist, one must
operationally be "something elseist" as well-e.g., wealthist,
resourcist, etc.62 Second, since welfare emerges from what distribuees
do with whatever is literally distributed, and since the latter
materials are in most cases scarce, would-be distributors must decide
how to respond to distribuees' capacities and responsibilities for
producing their own welfare out of what they are allotted. I will
discuss the fuller significance of these opened lines below, both in
connection with competing proposed distribuenda, and in connection
with distribution formulae.
There are, finally, familiar measurability concerns occasioned
by welfare as proposed distribuendum. On most present-day
construals, as noted above in II.C.1, welfare no more lends itself to
practicable quantiflability or interpersonal comparability in the
holding than it does to direct distributability. Commensurability is
the one measurement task for which welfare does not present
difficulties, since in theory it serves as a num6raire in terms of which
more concrete items are comparatively valued. The trouble, of course,
is that in view of its unamenability to actual quantification or
interpersonal comparison, it can serve as num6raire only "in theory."
It is of no practical use at all.
We shall presently see that "subjective" welfare is the inverse
image of more "objective," physical distribuenda and can be
60. The "tamed housewife" is featured in Amartya Sen, The Standard of
Living 11 (1987).
61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62. More on wealth, resources, etc., infra Part II.C.3.
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measured as such. In fact it appears that the two things-welfare
and the physical items from which distribuees derive it-must be
brought together in some way for distribuendum-measurement
problems to be addressed in an ethically intelligible manner. This,
along with its practical consequences, will emerge in my discussions
below.
2. Resources/Wealth
The principal competitors to welfare as proposed
distribuendum have historically been material resources or wealth of
one sort or another. "Resources," like "welfare," have been defined in
terms ranging from the simple and abstract, to the complex and
concretely particular. The simplest and most abstract
characterization is simply as wealth, or an index-tied medium of
exchange or scalar "stuff' that recipients can transform into welfare
purchasing and consuming more variegated goods and services.63
More complex and concretely particularized characterizations include
Rawlsian "primary goods," among others.?
As indicated at the end of the previous subsection, the
advantages and disadvantages of resources as prospective
distribuenda can be viewed as the inverse image of the
disadvantages and advantages of welfare. First, resources are
directly distributable. Second, they are readily measurable, at least
with respect to simple quantification and interpersonal comparability
in the holding, as noted above in II.B.1. And finally third, they take
into consideration the possibility that distribuees will affect their
own well-being. Considering resources as distribuenda then assumes
63. This includes risk-bearing services, the fuller significance of which
emerges infra Part III.B.2. This rough characterization of wealth, incidentally, is
cognate with but not identical to that offered by Posner in the 1980s, as discussed
infra Part III.A. A suitable synonym for my usage would be "purchasing power."
64. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 54-55, 78-81, 358-65 (rev'd
ed., 1999) (defining "primary goods" as things that every rational man is
presumed to want); see also John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (2000)
(reformulating the definition of "primary goods" more abstractly as those goods
necessary for a system to maintain its "distinctive structure" and to achieve its
"purpose and role"). I prescind from those complexities here. They are not
germane to present purposes and bracketing them accordingly does no harm. A
more complete discussion is found in Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary
Goods Revisited, Cornell J. Econ. & Phil. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931048.
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that the satisfactions distribuees enjoy will ride partly upon what
they do with their resource allotments. That seems to most people
both ethically right and efficient in the sense of providing incentives
to individuals to assume responsibility for their own well-being. We
will resume this discussion when we turn to distribuees, distribution
formulae and distribution mechanisms below.
Resources' disadvantages are straightforward functions of the
degree to which, if any, considerations of the propriety of their spread
are detached from objective considerations of welfare. Where that
detaching is complete and entire, resourcism devolves into fetishism.
We should always bear in mind the fact that resources are, trivially,
in every case resources for something. They count as resources, as
distinguished from merely insipid, ethically inert substances, only by
reference to the purposes and preferences that users have for them.
"Wealth" for its part-derived as it is from the Middle English
"weal," as in "common weal"-is cognate with "well-being" itself.65 So
resources or wealth even to count as such, must be tied in some
manner to that which concerns the distribuees who engage our
normative distributional concern, or well-being. The question thus
opened is: in what way, precisely? The full answer emerges only once
we have arrived at proposed distribution formulae and distribution
mechanisms.6 6
Relations between resource and welfare implicate
measurement matters, too. As noted before, resources raise no direct
challenge where quantification and comparison of interpersonal
holdings alone are concerned. But they do raise an indirect challenge
where the ethical relevance of quantities and holdings are concerned.
For ethical relevance here, as just observed, is tied partly-though
critically-to welfare-yield. The indirect challenge is this: Suppose
that a given distribuendum yields differing welfare measures to
differing distribuees. Suppose also that welfare is ultimately what
matters. Suppose finally that welfare itself is, as observed earlier,
not practicably quantifiable or interpersonally comparable in the
holding. If we accept those three plausible suppositions, then it is not
immediately apparent what ethically cognizable advantage is offered
by resources' ability to be quantified.
65. See Hockett, Why Paretians Can't Prescribe, supra note 13.
66. See infra Parts II.D, III.A.
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The direct challenge is this: Suppose resources are disparate.
Suppose also that each is not properly subject to its own distribution
formula. Some means of indexing, then, must be developed for such
terms as "total resources" or "wealth" to bear content. But now note
that de facto valuation occurs when comparative weightings are
assigned to vector components in fashioning the scalar along which
"total resources" or "wealth" are to be quantified. Note also that
ethically satisfying such valuation must again involve measurement-
challenging welfare. It follows, in such case, that indexing too will be
problematic. How, then, to make resource measurement ethically
intelligible?
Fortunately, it happens that a well specified distribution
mechanism allows both for unobjectionable indexing and coupling of
measurable resources and the more abstract notion of human
welfare. I must then again ask the reader to bear with me until we
have completed this Part.
3. Opportunity/Access
The difficulty in considering resources as distribuenda
actually mirrors the characterization of welfare as such. The danger
that afflicts welfare is that all preferences, even admittedly anti-
ethical ones, might be counted as affording normatively valuable
"welfare." The danger that afflicts resources is at the other extreme.
It is that no preferences will be considered when labeling ethically
inert, non-valued substances "resources."67 The idea is that because
welfare, or "advantage," is what matters to people, material "stuff' in
itself is not ethically salient. Moreover, since material resources are
varied and thus in need of commensuration if they are to be spread
under one distribution formula, some common denominator is
required. Again that may be termed as "welfare," or "advantage."
Accordingly, the item whose spread can intelligibly engage our
distributive-ethical concern or assessment, even if material in
nature, must be understood as "opportunity for welfare," or "access to
advantage." For it is only in virtue of their connection to human well-
67. It is worth noting that "resource" is subject to objectionable over-
inclusive construal as well, just as "welfare" is subject to objectionable under-
inclusive construal: Just as it is philistine to treat welfare as solely hedonic, it is
grotesque to claim all things the possession of which might afford pleasure can be
counted as "resources." Slaveholders and some husbands seem often to have
viewed human beings in this way, for example.
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faring or advantage that such materials become normatively
interesting rather than merely inert or fetishized.6 8
For reasons that will be plain in light of the discussion in Part
II.C.3 supra, I think that "opportunity for welfare" and "access to
advantage" as so described are best understood simply as alternative
christenings of resources or wealth. Their advantage over the terms
"resources" or "wealth," if such they carry, stems merely from a
possibility noted above: that some people have grown numb over time
to the fact that resources or wealth, to be resources or wealth as
distinguished from unwanted, ethically inert material, are simply
opportunities for welfare.69 They are modes of access to advantage.
Resources and wealth represent, one might say, "material
opportunity"-opportunity to satisfy wants, to effectuate plans, to
build lives, and to potentially enhance welfare. For the remainder of
this piece, I shall use the terms "resource," "wealth," and "material
opportunity" by and large interchangeably, with occasional caveats
registered where necessary.7 °
D. Distribution Formulae
"To distribute," like other verbs, is subject to adverbial
68. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare, 56 Phil. Stud. 77, 80 (1989) (arguing that the idea of equal opportunity
for welfare is the best interpretation of the ideal of distributive equality); Richard
J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 158, 159 (1990) (arguing that, for the purposes of
determining what should count as fair shares from the standpoint of distributive
justice, the appropriate measure of a person's resources is some function of the
importance those resources have for that very person as weighted by her
conception of her own welfare); Cohen, supra note 55. An analogue in the case of
welfare would be someone suggesting we use "ethically compatible preferences"
instead. Just as the term "welfare" already connotes such conditions (in contrast
to "satisfaction" or "utility"), the word "resources," I am claiming, already
connotes the conditions I note here.
69. Rather as some seem to have grown numb to the fact that well-being is
not ethically unevaluated pleasure.
70. These caveats concern the distinction that one must draw, in some
cases, between what I will call "ethically exogenous" and "ethically endogenous"
resources, wealth, and opportunity. Ethically exogenous holdings are those one is
not responsible for. Ethically endogenous holdings are those one is responsible
for. The discussion of distribution formulae, below, elaborates the normative
significance of this distinction. The relevance of the distinction at present is
simply that the terms "material opportunity" and "resource" may immediately
connote ethical exogeneity to many, while "wealth" probably does not.
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modification. Distributive claims effectively mandate conformity to
one or another such modification. They say, in effect, "things should
be distributed thus . . . ." Such mandates are themselves in turn
subject to feasibility constraints that figure into further adverbial
modifications, such as, "things can be distributed thus .... ." In sum,
then, we ask both "how ought?" and '"ow can?" The class of possible
replies to the second question effectively constrains plausible replies
to the first.
In posing the first question, we are asking for specification of
what I call a "distribution formula." In posing the second question,
we ask for specification of what I call a "distribution mechanism." I
treat the first here, and the second in Part III.
Historically there have been three leading candidate families
on offer as distribution formulae. I call their advocates "maximizers,"
"maximiners," and "egalitarians," of one stripe or another. Each
family is best known through one or two of its historically most
influential member formulae. Each also has featured one or more
member formulae argued for by appeal to hypothetical veiled choice
scenarios. Accordingly, I will first discuss each of the distinct families
of candidates by reference to its best known members. Then I will
briefly discuss veiled choice scenarios as employed in respect of all
three. I will conclude with (a) observations on the possible
combinations of maximizing and equalizing formulae, and (b)
observations on the distributional equivalence of many formulae with
differing "mixes" of variable-valuations.
1. Naive Maximization
The best known maximizing distribution formulae on offer
are those I call "naive" maximizing formulae.7 1 The operative ideal
behind such formulae is disarmingly simple. It is that whatever is
distributed should be distributed in such a manner as maximizes the
quantity of some aggregate thing assumed to be normatively salient.
71. Strictly speaking, maximization can no more be a mere distribution
formula than welfare can be a literal distribuendum. Instead, maximization, like
welfare, serves as a touchstone or focal point. The idea is to distribute in such
manner as will maximize some aggregate, just as, in the case of welfare-as-
distribuendum, one is to distribute something other than welfare in such manner
as produces welfare in distribuees. For this reason it turns out, as claimed in the
Introduction, that maximizing and equalizing formulae are interformulable. See
infra Part II.D.4.
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Typically, that means somehow-aggregated wealth or welfare,
summed over the distribuees who hold or enjoy it.72 If distribution D1
yields aggregate wealth or welfare W1, D2 yields W2, and W2 exceeds
W1, then D2 ethically dominates D1 on this view. Our goal, simply
put, is:
Max E Wi
In
where "i" indexes by distribuee and "n" designates the number
thereof in the society in question.73
Maximization in so unalloyed a form has, unsurprisingly,
provoked objections. These include charges of (a) fetishism, (b)
objectionably unequal treatment of distribuees, (c) objectionable
treatment of distribuees as nonresponsible patients, or less often (d)
some combination of these. 4 It is insufficiently observed, I believe,
that the combined objection, (d), is analytically the most satisfactory.
For the separate objections are not independent. One tends
conceptually to entail the others, as we will now demonstrate.
The fetishism charge is more typically aimed at naive would-
be wealth-maximizers than welfare-maximizers, though this fact
reflects a confusion that should be unveiled. The idea is that
maximizing wealth for its own sake, without proper ethical regard for
wealth-makers and -takers, is ethically indistinguishable from
maximizing, say, the quantum of blue-colored surface-area in the
universe. There seems no ethically cognizable reason for such pursuit
if it does not entail proper treatment of distribuees person by person.
And if it is indeed individuals who ultimately matter to us, then what
constitutes proper treatment of individuals should be explicable
72. Welfare aggregation and maximization are associated with utilitarian
ethics. Wealth maximization is associated with normative economics of law. See
infra Part III.A.
73. Please bear in mind that this is the form of "naive" maximization
formulae. I will discuss departures from the basic form as we proceed. See also
supra note 14.
74. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 36, at 11-64 (evaluating the merits and
problems of distributional equality with utilitarianism); Sen, supra note 42, at
468-71 (discussing the weaknesses of welfarism from an egalitarian perspective);
see also Markovits, supra note 36, at 2295 (arguing that egalitarianism should
nullify the differential impacts of luck, and pointing out the differences between
"patients" and "agents" of welfare).
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without reference to any aggregate; it must be independently
specifiable.7 5
Though it is less often, if indeed ever, observed, naive
welfare-maximizing is subject to precisely the same charge of
fetishism as is naive wealth-maximizing. Welfare might well be-
indeed might stipulatively or otherwise trivially be-"what matters"
to people. But if produced by means that are indifferent to the proper
identification and treatment of numerically distinct, politically equal
distribuees, it is no less ethically inert than is wealth or blue surface-
space. For again, normative concern for individuals requires
attention to the deserved or earned wealth or welfare of each equal-
rights-bearing citizen, one by one. Individualist normativity takes no
cognizance of any antecedently defined aggregate-even a welfare
aggregate-in terms of which individuals' rights are but posteriorly
defined and apportioned. To hold otherwise is to hold that the
aggregate's distribution does not normatively matter, hence that
individuals and their political equality do not matter.76 And that is
precisely what is fetishist.
The unequal treatment charge leveled at naive maximization
is, in view of the foregoing, readily seen to be deeply connected to the
fetishism charge. It stems from the possibility that whatever is
maximized might be maximized by means that effectively treat
persons as being of ethically differing status, even before or apart
from their responsible choices.77 It can in theory turn out, for
example, that aggregate welfare or wealth would be maximized
simply by euthanizing faultless depressives or handicapped
persons.7 8 Or it might be that maximization would be best effected by
channeling resources or wealth toward persons blessed with high
endorphin counts or otherwise highly resource-responsive welfare
75. For a reminder of the basis of this supposition, see supra notes 14 and
15 and accompanying text.
76. Some such intuition underlies Robert Nozick's "utility monster"
objection to utilitarianism. It is not accidental that Nozick commences his preface
with the observation that "[i]ndividuals have rights." See Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia ix (1974) (analyzing the nature and functions of the State, and
advocating for limited government involvement).
77. In such cases we might say they are treated as being "antecedently" or
"exogenously," hence ethically essentially unequal.
78. Richard Posner professed in the early 1980s to be troubled by this
possible consequence in the case of welfare-maximization, but then puzzlingly
dismissed the concern in the case of wealth-maximization. See infra Part III.A.
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functions. Those would be people who, like Benedict in the
Introduction, derive disproportionate pleasure from what they
receive.79 It is argued that the fact that naive maximization
imperatives do not prohibit such measures in principle-and indeed
seem to welcome them--demonstrates maximization's unsuitability
to the task of articulating an ethically defensible distribution
formula.80
The patient-treatment objection to naive maximization is the
flipside of the unequal treatment objection. It is, like the unequal
treatment objection, also conceptually wedded to the fetishism
objection. The patient-treatment objection states that distribution
effected on the basis of morally arbitrary features of faultlessly
disadvantaged persons8' does more than treat such persons as
effectively expendable and non-rights-bearing. It also treats morally
arbitrarily advantaged persons8 2 as being of meritlessly higher
ethical or political status. And, crucially from the vantage of this
objection, it does so quite apart from the quality which constitutes
the beneficiaries as fellow persons-their responsible human agency.
There is a deep sense in which naive maximization is, so to
speak, "metaphysically" patronizing. The advantage enjoyed is as
disturbingly contingent, and in consequence alienating and
demoralizing, as one's birth into a right to larger distributive shares
than those enjoyed by others is the product of a dubious "blessing." It
is effectively her birth into a polity that treats her as a patient and,
indeed, as an object. For she is treated as one whose politically
honored advantages are not really her own-not the product of her
agency-but instead a conditional gift conferred by society in virtue
of an accident. They are conferred simply because the beneficiary is,
so to speak, "productively blonde."83 In such a polity she is only
79. See Nozick, supra note 76, at 232-46 (examining issues of equality,
welfare distribution and the obligations of the state).
80. Probably the best known instance of this argumentative tack is
Nozick's "utility monster" objection to utilitarianism. See Nozick, supra note 76,
at 241. It is no answer to say that this does not typically happen in practice.
Normativity concerns not happy accidents, but principles.
81. For example, depressives and handicapped persons, as just discussed.
82. Nozick's "utility monsters" and talent-Ubermenschen (the wealthily
born among us), for example.
83. Imagine a society in which blondes were so rare that birth with blonde
hair was viewed as a sign from the gods. A rare blonde is in consequence treated
as an avatar, maintained in a temple and endowed with sacramental gifts. Is
there not an obvious sense in which such "lucky winners" would experience
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contingently favored-an accident of birth. She is a mere funnel into
which the channeling of resources simply happens to produce a
higher aggregate. That, it can be argued, is deeply disrespectful and
ultimately harmful to our conceptions of ourselves, both for the
fortunate and unfortunate alike.84
A final objection to naive maximization is rooted in
measurement challenges of the kind surveyed above in II.B.1. Where
welfare is held out as maximandum, the objection is that welfare, in
the abstract, is not sufficiently amenable to comparison in the
holding as to provide the idea of "maximization" with content. Where
wealth is the proposed maximandum, the measurement rooted
objection finds its ground ultimately in commensurability. One
objects that the absence of markets in many valued or potentially
valued goods and services-including risk-bearing services-renders
the "wealth" that is maximized an ethically incomplete index. Or,
relatedly, one points to one or another variant of the so-called
"Scitovsky paradox" and concludes that, since two states of the world
can be superior to one another according to the Kaldor-Hicks
principle, and since the Kaldor-Hicks criterion accordingly does not
yield an ordering, "wealth" is not sufficiently determinate an
aggregate as to be amenable to intelligible maximization.85
themselves as freakish, radically separated off from others? The sense in which
this is damaging to the putative beneficiary will be familiar to those who have
read of the psychological damage experienced by many members of royal and
celebrity families. It is also a staple of fiction concerning the longings of
celebrities, royalty, avatars and even angels to lead ordinary lives. See, e.g., Mark
Twain, The Prince and the Pauper (1882). Also such films as The Last Emperor,
Roman Holiday, and Wings of Desire.
84. This is because the favorable treatment is contingent upon morally
arbitrary, accidental features, and is impliedly withdrawn immediately upon
even accidental loss of such features. Some such intuition as this would appear to
underwrite the expressions of alienation, anxiety, and even humiliation
sometimes heard from people who are found physically attractive by large
numbers of others. Analogous concerns sometimes are registered by opponents of
affirmative action programs who have been beneficiaries of such programs. See,
e.g., Clarence Thomas, My Grandfather's Son: A Memoir 107 (2007) (discussing
how principles of self reliance would do more to lift black people out of poverty
than affirmative action policies like quotas). There is a link here to the notion of a
"right to punishment" as discussed supra note 34. The link is well drawn in
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment (1866).
85. As Scitovsky shows, if state of the world A can be shown to be superior
to B, and then B is shown superior to A, the two states are not determinately
ordered. Such is the "Scitovsky paradox," which Scitovsky shows to be endemic to
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Naive maximizers offer well-worn rejoinders to these
objections. To the fetishism charge, the rejoinder is either that
welfare is what matters to people (in the case of welfare-maximizers)
or that wealth affords opportunity to satisfy preferences, hence
welfare (in the case of wealth-maximizers).,6 In both cases, it is
concluded, maximizing cannot, in consequence, be fetishistic.
This rejoinder is a non sequitur. The fetishism charge is not
that welfare and wealth do not matter. It is that their naive
maximization does not matter. It is that naive maximization
misunderstands the ways in which welfare and wealth matter. 8 As
themselves, these of course matter by definition to everyone. But as
maximized pursuant to a merely additive maximizing formula, they
at best matter only, or objectionably disproportionately, to those
lucky enough to attract distributions that are wealth-productive for
them. Welfare or wealth will not in such case matter to "us," whose
collective role is that of evaluating a distribution formula's ethically
appropriate treatment of each rights-bearing constituent member of
the distributing polity that we jointly constitute.
To the unequal- and patient-treatment charges, naive
maximizers also have offered rejoinders that amount to non
sequiturs. In the case of the unequal treatment charge, the rejoinder
would-be orderings attempted along a Kaldor-Hicksian "compensation" or
"wealth" metric. See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in
Economics, 9 Rev. Econ. Stud. 77, 88 (1941); see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 509, 513-16 (1980) (analyzing
the merits of Pareto utilitarianism and its implications for social welfare). The
determinacy objection is also grounded in distribution. See infra Part III.A.
86. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice 88-103 (1983)
(exploring the ethical and political basis of wealth maximization and explaining
the wealth maximization efficiency of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); Arneson, Equality,
supra note 68, at 77 (arguing that "the idea of equal opportunity for welfare is the
best interpretation of the ideal of distributive equality").
87. The rhetorically rich but perhaps overstated title of a well-known
article by Dworkin might be partly responsible for this misunderstanding. See
Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980); see also infra
Part III.A. The misunderstanding itself permeates Dworkin. See Bruce Johnsen,
Wealth Is Value, 15 J. Leg. Stud. 263, 269 (1986) (arguing that a broader
definition of "wealth" encompassing non-material goods can inform the
misunderstandings in the Posner-Dworkin debate).
88. See Hockett, Why Parestians Can't Prescribe, supra note 13, at 85
(noting that "how [one] weights differing persons' individual satisfaction
functions in computing a social welfare aggregate will determine who [one] thinks
should receive what scarce resources in what amounts").
HeinOnline -- 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 379 2008-2009
380 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [40:343
is that maximization counts each person's utility or wealth-
production function for one in the global welfare function.89 One
individual function, the claim runs, one "vote," hence equal
treatment. We encountered this "Hail Mary" play above, in the
Introduction."
The reply is a non sequitur for reasons also noted in the
Introduction. It unethically reduces distribuees to their welfare or
wealth-production functions. That mis-identification amounts to a
form of fetishism with respect to distribuees that is on all fours with
the fetishism of naive maximization with respect to distribution
formulae. One is no more one's wealth- or welfare-function than one
is one's nose. If people are both faultlessly and non-creditably born
with different such functions,9 then equal treatment of those
functions is unequal treatment of those persons who are born with
them. And it is precisely that, in effect, which is of concern to those
who level the unequal treatment objection.92
To the treatment-as-patients objection, the rejoinder is that,
since distribuees are boundedly autonomous agents who act partly to
produce their own welfare or wealth, and since distributing so as to
maximize welfare or wealth is to distribute disproportionately to the
best, "most efficient" such welfare- or wealth-producers,
maximization effectively coincides with agent-rewarding. 93
89. See, e.g., John J. C. Smart, An Outline of Utilitarianism, in John J. C.
Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 32 (1973) (stating
the utilitarian principle that an individual counts "neither more nor less than any
other person").
90. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
91. This is true most dramatically, though not exclusively, in the case of
congenital depressives and handicapped persons.
92. See Dworkin, supra note 87 (arguing that the normative failures of the
economic analysis of law are so great that they cast doubt on its descriptive
claims unless these descriptive claims can be embedded within a very different
normative theory); Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980)
(arguing for a deep equality theory over and against a compromise theory of
"trade-offs" between distribution and wealth advocated by Calabresi and Posner).
93. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin
and Kronman, 9 J. Legal Stud. 243 (1980) (commenting on Dworkin and
Kronman's respective approaches to wealth maximization in relation to his own
approach); Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 103 (1979) (distinguishing utilitarianism from economics and arguing
that the economic norm of "wealth maximization" provides a firmer basis for a
normative theory of law than does utilitarianism).
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This rejoinder is half right, half non sequitur, and so we shall
find it half echoed in what turns out to be the most plausible
characterization of the correct distribution formula further below.
The problem is that it places the cart before the horse, so to speak,
and in so doing fetishizes the cart. If distribuees bear rights to equal
treatment as agents ex ante, prior to engaging in the actions for
which they are responsible, then the "horse" should be distribution
considered prior to the consequences for any ex post aggregate. For
that aggregate is as much the product of agents' responsible actions
as it is of the ex ante distribution. Attend to the propriety of the
latter, then, and the appropriate aggregate-the nonfetishist,
ethically cognizable aggregate-will effectively take care of itself: it
will be maximized quite "automatically," ex post by responsible
agents, as the output of their actions upon the correctly, ex ante
distributed inputs.94
Maximizers do not appear to have arrived at a canonical
rejoinder to the measurement-rooted objections to maximization. I
believe that is no accident. The key to an answer lies in turning away
from the assessment of distributive welfare-outputs altogether, in
favor of the assessment of distributive resource-inputs. Once we do
that, ready answers to all measurement challenges are immediately
forthcoming. I will defer elaboration on that point to Part II.E, on
distribution mechanisms.
2. Prioritarian Maximining
Prompted by some of the shortcomings of naive maximizing
just discussed are "prioritarian" views, a recently influential family
of candidates for distribution formula. We shall see that they are not,
however, adequately responsive to these shortcomings. Probably the
best known prioritarian distribution formula is also one of the
earliest. I refer to the "maximin" formula defended most thoroughly
by John Rawls.95 Rawls and additional prioritarians argue that many
of the differences among persons that effectively recommend
94. Cognate observations apply to those maximizers who observe that
maximizing might tend to coincide with equalizing in view of the diminishing
marginal utility of wealth, or of whatever else is distributed. Quite apart from the
claim's ignorance of responsible agency and its reliance upon the happy accident
of concavity, it invites the question: If you are serious about equality, why bother
with naive maximizing at all? See infra Part II.D.4.
95. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64.
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disparate treatment are, as Rawls put it, "arbitrary from a moral
point of view."96 Rawls concludes that such differences should not be
distribution-determinative, precisely because they are morally
arbitrary.97 If we are to treat one another as moral equals, these
differences must be compensated for, so as not to place people at a
relative disadvantage.
Neutralizing such differences altogether, Rawls seems to
have recognized, would result in our pursuit of an egalitarian
distribution formula of some sort.98 Indeed, it might even result in an
outcome-egalitarian formula, though this is not clear.99 But Rawls
shied away from full-bore egalitarian distribution of any sort, on the
theory that some departures from equality might render even the
"worst-off" among unequals "better-off' than they would be under
conditions of equality. In consequence, Rawls concluded, departures
from equal distribution are morally tolerable if, but only to the
degree that, they tend to better the lot of "the worst-off."1 0
Rawls labeled this Grundnorm "the difference principle."0 1 If
naive maximizing is tide-raising, and if a rising tide not only lifts all
boats but lifts them so high that the lowest are raised higher than
they would have been under an egalitarian distribution formula,
then we might say maximization will be ethically permissible. But it
will be so only on condition that-and differing egalitarian
distributions will be globally preference-orderable precisely according
as--"the minimum" is maximized too. The aim, then, is:
Max E Wi
1 n*
where "i" again indexes by distribuee and "n*" designates the best-off
member of the worst-off class, hence the cut between "worst-off class"
96. Id. at 72.
97. Id. at 86-93.
98. Id. at 12-19, 52-56, 86-93.
99. The sense in which it's not clear will emerge presently.
100. There's quite a leap here. But I aim here to exposit, not defend,
Rawls's chain of reasoning.
101. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 65-68. By a
"Grundnorm," I mean a "basic," or "founding" principle-a fundamental value
from which other values derive. I take and adapt the term from Kelsen. See
generally Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 55 (1928) (employing the term to
designate a foundational rule from which other rules in a legal system ultimately
derive their authority).
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and all others. Maximin is accordingly the formulaic upshot of
Rawls's difference principle.
Both the difference principle and maximin turn out, on
reflection, to be only a bit better than non sequitur responses to
Rawls's specific objections to na've maximization. They turn out in
consequence to be rather cruderemedies, if indeed determinate
remedies at all.
For one thing, "the worst-off' class is quite indeterminate:
Not only is it unclear whether it is the worst off person, the worst off
0.1% of persons, the worst off centile or decile or quintile or some
other percentage. In addition, it is unclear even how we are to decide.
No principles are on offer, nor does any particular rationale seem to
offer itself.'0 2 That is a bit troubling, given that maximin is meant to
neutralize morally arbitrary determinants of distributive shares, and
thus afford ethically satisfactory guidance to lawmakers.
A closely related difficulty is that the idea of the "worst-off
class" does not even seem to be clearly conceived or intelligibly
motivated, let alone defined, by Rawls with any view to the reasons
for anyone's being worst off.0 3 Rawls draws no distinction, for
example, between those who are worst-off by chance and those who
are in effect worst-off by choice, say owing to self-destructive
behavior, for example. 10 4 Yet if any distinction of interest to
distributional evaluation is not "morally arbitrary,"-and surely
there must be some that are not if the predicate is to do any work-
one would think it would be that one.
Why, then, do Rawls and other prioritarians not consider
such questions in connection with "the worst-off' and their proposed
distribution formulae? No answer is forthcoming.' 5 That is strange
102. Rawls's failure to offer a basis on which to make the cut does not seem
to me accidental. There is no principled basis. And that, I believe, stems directly
from the difference principle's failure directly to address its own motivating
concern-the concern with morally arbitrary distinctions among persons that
result in their differential faring. The only principled means of addressing that
concern, in turn, not only supply a satisfactory theoretical baseline, but also
render the difference principle itself quite superfluous. Rawls thus emerges as an
unstable resting point en route from naive to ethically cognizable maximizing-
or, in other words, from ethically non-cognizable to ethically cognizable
equalizing. See infra Parts II.D.3, II.D.4, III.A.2.
103. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 83-84.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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and troubling, particularly given Rawls's own proffered reasons for
abandoning naive maximizing.'0 6 For insofar as there is divergence
between those who are responsibly worse-off on the one hand,
accidentally worse-off on the other, maximining looks no less
"morally arbitrary" than naive maximizing. Both maximize morally
arbitrarily; they differ only in maximizing different maximanda.
That means in turn that maximining no more treats distribuees as
moral equals and responsible agents than does maximization.
Almost as if to register that he was at least obliquely aware
of these problems, Rawls's full theory of appropriate distribution
employed two more devices apparently meant to bring a modicum of
responsible agency and equal treatment back into the account. The
first device was the familiar "veil of ignorance" alluded to earlier.
0 7
Rawls's claim here was, in effect, that in their roles as distributors,
distribuees "would" select maximin, assuming they did not know in
advance whom they eventually "would" become. 0 8 In this case,
choosers would be prevented from choosing to benefit themselves
over others because features distinguishing them from others would
be behind the veil, hidden from view. What perhaps was recognized
less explicitly, however, was that the veiled choice would render
maximin at least partly a responsible choice, as well. Conditions
could be attributed in part to a choice that Rawls asserts "would" be
made by anyone behind the veil. If so, choosing agents could be
appropriately held to the choice. The degree to which this veiled
choice scenario prompted Rawls is unclear. Conceivably, it
constituted at least part of his theory's attraction, consciously or
otherwise. I say this for two reasons. First, because of the
relationship between ethical equality and responsible agency, noted
above: The veil imposes impartiality and then holds the choosers
responsible for choices they "would" have made from behind it.
Second, because of the language Rawls used in motivating the second
responsibility-sensitive wrinkle to which I have alluded: his selection
of distribuendum. On, now, to that.
The second way Rawls addressed the responsible agency and
ethical equality problems afflicting his difference principle was
through his characterization of the appropriate distribuendum.
106. Id. at 86-93.
107. Id. at 118.
108. The reason for the scare-quotes around "would" will emerge
momentarily.
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Rawls prescribed distribution of what he called "an index of primary
goods"-in effect, a lumpy and only partly scalable vector of
disparate, broadly conceived resources.'0 9 Apparently, Rawls was
cognizant of the agency/equity value this prescription offered. First,
his explanations made some overt references to the fact that the
selection of primary goods as distribuenda effectively held distribuees
partly responsible for the production of their own welfare."0 Second,
Rawls expressly noted that treating primary goods as distribuenda
required distribuees to internalize the costs that their preferences for
primary goods imposed upon others.' In his brand of distributive
maximining, Rawls seems to have been at least an incipient
proponent of responsible agency in the theory of justice.
Rawls's shortcoming lies in that incipience. Primary goods as
distribuenda need not bear any connection to maximin as a
distribution formula. Indeed, those primary goods amount to little
more than a clumsy and ultimately incoherent graft-on. They render
Rawls a responsibility-tracer in respect of his distribuendum
selection, yet a moral accident-allower in his selection of distribution
formula." 2 Why? Because the "worst off' in respect even of primary
goods might be poorly off either by chance or by choice.
313
109. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 54-55, 78-81, 348, 358-
65. In light of the incomplete scalability, the index is but incompletely an index.
See supra Part II.C.1; see also Hockett & Risse, supra note 64.
110. Or, in Rawls's preferred idiom, the formulation and successful pursuit
of their own "plans of life." See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 79-
80.
111. Id. at 359.
112. This is not surprising given Rawls's ambivalence about responsibility.
On one hand, he defends his selection of primary goods as distribuendum by
reference to the importance of responsibility. On the other, he at times argues
deterministically (and confusedly) that people are not responsible unless they can
choose freely, and that they cannot choose freely because they do not choose their
faculties for choosing. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 90-93,
182.
113. See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 Nofis 429,
429 (1990) (addressing the argument asserted by Rawls's challengers "that using
primary goods shares to compare individual situations is unfair to those
individuals for whom primary goods will not be particularly useful for the
successful pursuit of their life plans," and concluding that "a principle of
distributive justice ought" not "to use primary goods as the basis of interpersonal
comparisons 0"). If leisure was considered a primary good, we would not be able to
say that voluntary non-workers, poor in other primary goods, were poorly off.
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Theoretically, the treatment of maximin as a product of
veiled choice might have rectified, to some degree, the paradox noted
in Rawls's theory-particularly if the choice had been made, or if
there were reason to suppose it would have been made. But the
choice theory implied by Rawls's selection of maximin as distribution
formula is "exotic" at best."4 At least with regard to preference
schedule, the choice Rawls's selection imputes is extensionally
equivalent to the choice that would be made only by those who are
infinitely risk averse." 5 Accordingly, there is little reason to suppose
the choice even would be made, let alone has been made. Hence, the
choice theory affords little responsible agency to Rawls's
characterization of the appropriate distribution formula.
In sum, Rawlsian justice theory seems an unstable mixture of
agent/patient and responsibility-tracing/accident-permitting,
distributive-ethical prescription. And maximining-the distribution
formula that gives partial expression to that mixture-appears as
ethically arbitrary as the naive maximizing it is meant to supplant.
3. Equalizing: Naive and Sophisticated Varieties
There are a number of proposed egalitarian distribution
formulae." 6 Some of these can be viewed as purifications of original
Rawlsian insights, others not. As we shall see, proposals of the
former, sophisticated sort may also be characterized as more
ethically plausible forms of maximization.' 7 Proposals of the latter
114. See John E. Roemer, Egalitarianism against the Veil of Ignorance, 99
J. Phil. 167, 168 (2002) (referring to Rawls's "exotic decision theory").
115. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on
Rawls's Theory of Justice, 70 J. Phil. 245, 253-54 (1973) (critiquing Rawls's
concept of primary goods as inadequate for reaching accurate interpersonal
comparisons); Leonid Hurwicz, Optimality Criteria for Decision Making Under
Ignorance, 370 Statistics 1, 1 (1951) (theorizing that "if certain properties are
assumed for the optimality criterion.., then an action must be evaluated merely
in terms of the best and worst it may accomplish"); Geoffrey A. Jehle & Philip J.
Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory 260 (2d ed. 2001) ("Rawls's own argument
for the maximin over the utilitarian rests on the view that people are risk-averse.
But this cannot be a wholly persuasive argument .... Rawls' maximin criterion
... can be seen as a very special case . . . that arises when individuals are
infinitely risk averse.") (emphasis in original).
116. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 41; Dworkin, supra note 36; Sen, supra
note 55; Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, supra note 68.
117. See infra Part II.D.4.
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naive variety suffer from the same flaws as do naive maximizing and
Rawlsian prioritarianism as explained below."'
The concept behind the more sophisticated proposals can be
articulated in the following way: Suppose that some differences
among persons were partly causative of their differential faring, yet
"arbitrary from a moral point of view." 19 The most immediately
satisfactory distribution formula simply would partition each
person's holdings into portions Ri, traceable to moral arbitrariness,
and 1-Ri, traceable to responsible agency. The formula would then
mandate equalization of Ri, while facilitating agents' own
maximization of 1-Ri.
The morally arbitrary portion of any one person's holdings,
Ri, would be valued invariantly across all persons i. The
nonarbitrary portion, Ei, would be permitted-indeed, required-to
vary among persons according to the degrees of responsible effort
they expend on productive activities valued by a market comprising
themselves and others. 20  The distribution formula could be
expressed as:
Vi: Hi = Ei + Ri = Ei + R/n
where "Vi" is "for all i," "Hi" designates each person i's holdings, "n"
is the number of persons i, and "R /n" designates the constant that is
each i's pro rata share of the exogenously given residuum, R. 2 '
R could be called "luck"; "ethically exogenous resources";
"ethically exogenous opportunity"; "the exogenous endowment";
118. Id.
119. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 86-93.
120. In that case, leisure would not count as part of one's "holdings." Were
we to count leisure as part of one's holdings, we would say that Ei's composition,
rather than Ei itself, varies across persons i. One consequence would be that
maximization of the full vector of goods one enjoys "takes care of itself," as a
straightforward consequence of responsible choices made by distribuees as to the
disposition of their resource endowments-Ri. Implications of "varying degrees of
responsible effort in activities varyingly valued by themselves and others" are
traced and treated below. The basic idea is that any surplus you end up with over
your mandatorily equalized, ethically exogenous endowment is properly a matter
of what others give you in exchange for what you give them. This proves
particularly important in the treatment of distribution mechanisms infra Part
III.B.
121. R would be the sum of each person i 's Ri. That is, R = F Ri. Here,
summing requires commensuration and interpersonal comparability.
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and "the responsibility-indifferent residuum," among others.
Accordingly, those who would equalize Ri across persons could be
labeled "luck egalitarians," "resource egalitarians," "responsibility-
tracing egalitarians," "opportunity egalitarians," and so on. I shall
call them "opportunity egalitarians" for reasons analogous to those
offered supra Part III.B.3, in treating "resources," "opportunity for
welfare," and "access to advantage" as variants of "material
opportunity."
Most adherents to opportunity egalitarianism regard Rawls
as an incipient opportunity egalitarian.' To them, Rawls simply had
not managed fully to purge his views of the naive utilitarian
maximization imperative, which he sought to replace with an
individualist distributive-ethical ideal. A full purge consistently
would treat distribuees as boundedly responsible agents,
distribuenda as fully indexed goods and services rather than lumpy
Rawlsian "primary goods," and the correct distribution formula as
that which distributes goods and services in a manner that is
systematically responsive to the boundary between faultless chance
and responsible choice.
Opportunity egalitarians are not without challenges. That
cut between chance and choice, or "Ri" and "Ei" above, can be
difficult to draw for a number of reasons. 123 In addition, there are
problems of commensuration, which plague any distribution mode
that takes as distribuenda a variety of material goods and services.
Particularly troublesome is the fact that opportunity egalitarianism
confronts head-on all morally arbitrary determinants of wellbeing.
But among those determinants are such deeply personal or internal
resources as talents and handicaps. This means that to be thorough
and consistent, opportunity egalitarians require some means of
122. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Philosophy and Politics, 21 Phil. and Pub.
Aff. 299, 321 (1992) ("Rawls's claim is that just institutions need make no special
provision for expensive preferences . . . because people living in a just society
have the capacity to adjust their preferences in light of the resources they can
expect to have at their command.").
123. See generally Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27
Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 74-75 (2005) (arguing that, if ethical holdings or entitlements
are examined prior to an individual's entry into the market, subsequent
violations of these holdings by chance or choice may raise different questions
about how to compensate for the harm); Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic
by Hamiltonian Means, 79 So. Cal. L. Rev. 45, 59 (2006) (describing the
difficulties in drawing the boundary between ethically endogenous choice and
ethically exogenous circumstance, among others).
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equalizing these personal resources and deficits along with all
external inputs to welfare functions. 124 That task appears difficult.
Nevertheless, these challenges merely reduce slightly the
clear and significant advantages afforded by opportunity
egalitarianism. The opportunity egalitarian principle
straightforwardly coheres with the view of distribuees as ethically
equal, boundedly responsible agents, as discussed above at II.B. It
shows better fit with that construal of distribuees than do naive and
prioritarian maximizing, and naive equalizing, as we will see below.
Likewise, it coheres with the view of appropriate distribuenda as
material inputs to individual welfare. That is, it better fits the
construal of appropriate distribuenda as material opportunities. The
same cannot be said for other proposed naive egalitarian distribution
formulae, as I will now show.
Competing positions, or naive maximizing and maximining,
do not even attempt to reap these advantages. In consequence, they
remain not merely practically but foundationally short of the
unquestioned ideal.
Some utilitarians, for example, have argued for wealth
equalization quite apart from any consideration of distribuees'
ethical equality or responsibility for wealth- or welfare-production.
To that end, they posit first that the utility functions are roughly the
same for all people, and second that the marginal utility of wealth is
diminishing per those functions. 125 If true, these conjectures suggest
that rough equalization of holdings would maximize aggregate
welfare.
Like all forms of utilitarianism, this view treats distribuees
as patients. It takes us for ethically inert, automatically operating
welfare manufactories into which wealth is fed, like worms into
chicks' beaks. It also treats distribuees as, at best, only contingently
equal, and more deeply unequal. For distribuees are treated as
124. This is a challenge, not a fault. Fault lies with views that do not even
notice that such "resources" are morally arbitrary.
125. See, e.g., Abba P. Lerner, The Economics of Control 24, 26 (1944)
(assuming that "different people enjoy similar satisfactions," and that "the
principle of diminishing marginal utility of income holds generally") (emphasis in
original); Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 137 (4th ed. 1932)
(concluding that if "complete equality among the values of marginal social net
products is wanting, a diminution in the degree of inequality that exists among
them is likely to benefit the national dividend").
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equals only in respect of a contingently identical feature, their utility
functions. Moreover, responsibly diligent distribuees are
expropriated on behalf of, and thereby conscripted for the purposes
of, the non-diligent. Only the utility aggregate is valued; the way it is
produced does not matter. Finally, this view treats aggregate
welfare, not wealth, as the distributive focal point.1 26 In short, then, it
remains a contingently income-equalizing version of naive
maximization.
Non-utilitarian welfare-egalitarians are another group of
equalizers who historically have construed distribuees as patients,
and thus ethical non-equals.1 27 They have done so by taking the
following positions, which jointly, if unwittingly, give rise to that
characterization. First, they acknowledge differing welfare functions
across persons. Second, in consideration of that fact, they advocate
differential wealth inputs across persons so as to equalize individual
welfare outputs. Third, in so doing, they hold distribuees entirely
unaccountable for their own welfare. And fourth, as a result, they
effectively accept conscription of the diligent to subsidize even the
willfully non-diligent, like the utilitarian and wealth egalitarians
detailed above. 128
Some advocates of this position presumably would abandon
it, were they fully cognizant of its entailments. Others, perhaps, hold
the position because they have some confused metaphysical belief
about agency. They are determinists, on which view all persons
"really" are patients-patients of God or of fate or of "nature"-
through and through.
1 29
In light of this latter observation, there is a sense in which
naive welfare-egalitarianism can be reconciled with, or even amount
126. It is also another case of putting the cart before horse. If wealth
equalizing is sought only for its putative aggregate welfare-maximizing, it is
sought in pursuit of a fetish.
127. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 125; Pigou, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. I admit to finding it difficult to make sense of this position. By its own
criteria it would be prompted in the saying by metaphysical necessity rather than
the proponent's free acceptance of the truth. We who hear the claim likewise will
do whatever we do as mere effects of the same occult causes rather than in
response to reasons. Reason-giving itself, such as determinist claims amount to,
seem to presuppose freedom of the only kind that matters-that which
underwrites attribution of responsibility. But alas, I must leave the free will
problem there for the present.
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to, a degenerate case of the opportunity-egalitarian position. Were it
somehow possible for both to intelligibly maintain and empirically
establish that nobody is "really" responsible for anything, then
welfare-egalitarianism would extensionally coincide with
opportunity-egalitarianism. One would simply set Ei trivially at zero
for all values of i in the formula set out above. This would
formulaically express the idea of no one's "really" being responsible
for anything, including for any portion of her own holdings. There
would then be no ethical point in distinguishing between
opportunity-input and welfare-output. I mention this prospect,
however, as a mere theoretical curio. I do not see how the antecedent
conditions-establishing that we are not "really" responsible for
anything-could be satisfied. Even so much as to articulate the
position would seem to be self-refuting.
Symmetrical remarks, incidentally, would hold of welfare-
maximizing utilitarianism as described above in Part II.C.2. Were it
plausible to hold persons responsible for everything rather than
nothing-even the entireties of their utility functions-then we
might set Ri trivially at zero for all values of i in the above-stated
opportunity-egalitarian formula in recognition of that "fact." Persons
i would be treated as equals by dint of their each counting for one
and there being no ethically exogenous residuum, for which they were
not responsible, to be spread objectionably unequally.130 Again there
would be no more point in distinguishing between opportunity-input
and welfare-output. Once again, however, the antecedent condition
here-distribuees' being responsible for everything-looks impossible
to maintain. We seem to be stuck with the cut-that between chance
and choice-the recognition of which is opportunity-egalitarianism's
theoretic blessing and (largely surmountable) pragmatic curse.'
31
A final point that bears noting has to do with equalization's
relation to fairness. "Fairness," on all semantically informed
understandings of the word, connotes impartiality or even-
130. On such a view you could presumably be held responsible for your
forehead height too. You'd be responsible for everything. Hence you could be
identified with everything, which is another reason, I suppose, to call people like
the early utilitarian Sidgwick "eyes of the universe." See Bart Schultz, Henry
Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe, An Intellectual Biography (2004).
131. "Largely surmountable," again, for reasons that emerge infra, Part
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handedness: 3 2 Commonly proffered synonyms of "fair" include
"equitable," "just," "impartial," "unbiased," "even-handed," "treating
like cases alike," and the like.'33 To treat parties fairly is to treat
them as equals for purposes of the treatment. It is to eliminate or
neutralize inequities that are exogenous to the purposes of the
treatment, and to retain or vindicate inequities that are endogenous
to the purposes of the treatment. These benefits and burdens would
be distributed in proportion to their connection to the purposes of
treatment.
Say, for example, that the purpose of the treatment in a
particular context is to distribute in accordance with responsible
human agency and nothing else-i.e., no morally arbitrary feature of
the distribuees. Then fair treatment in this context will be that
which allocates value to distribuees in proportion to their
creditability for value, or their level of production. 3 4 It will also,
then, a fortiori, be treatment that equally allocates value for the
attributes which no one is responsible for, since everyone is equally
not responsible for that remainder. (Zero equals zero, across the full
population.) Fair allocations, in short, will be those that equalize
holdings of such stuff as no one is responsible for, and require
holdings for which persons are in fact responsible to vary in
proportion to their responsibility. If this is so, then the class of fair
allocations would seem to be precisely the class of opportunity-
egalitarian allocations.
4. Interformulability
The immediately foregoing discussion of distribution
formulae suggests an obvious formal means of rendering the point
with which I introduced this Article. I said that to maximize one
thing is to distribute another thing and to equalize yet another
thing-the latter thing amounting, in turn, to some attribute with
which we identify distribuees. The observation made just above, that
certain equalization formulae can be construed as degenerate cases
132. It bears virtually no recognizable relation, incidentally, to Kaplow &
Shavell's proffered definition in their book cited supra note 1.
133. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 595 (6th ed. 1990).
134. "In proportion to .. .creditability for value-production" requires, if it
is to bear content, commensuration of disparate items and services, then cardinal
valuation of agents' inputs along the resulting index. For an illustration of this
point, see infra Part III.B.
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of maximization formulae and vice versa, amounts to a further
corroboration of the point. Let us now generalize it formulaically.
The following translation rule captures the basic idea. For
any aggregative maximizing imperative of the form:
Max E ui
in which u-factors are summed, simply translate the summand, ui,
into its counterpart equalisand, ui*, and state the imperative thus:
Vi: Eq (ui*)
where "Vi" is read, "for all i," and "Eq" means to "Equalize" just as
"Max" means to "Maximize." In short, rather than summing u-factors
and maximizing the sum, we enjoin functionaries, equivalently, to
equalize the summand's egalitarian counterpart, u* . Since there is
always a counterpart, we are always able to work the translation."'
Two brief, concrete examples will make the point plain.
Suppose first we are garden variety utilitarians. We accordingly wish
to maximize aggregate utility. We aim, then, to maximize the sum of
ui-measures over individuals i. The summand in this case is each
individual's "welfare," or "utility" measure, as ordinarily construed by
utilitarians. Each individual's utility function receives equal weight
in the global welfare function, a weight of one. That weighting is
accordingly what the global welfare function equalizes. Precisely this
point is what underwrites some utiltiarians' claim to be egalitarian,
as we noted earlier.
36
What these same utilitarians appear not to have noticed is
that the feature in virtue of which a global welfare function treats
individuals as equals, or their utility functions, is also the attribute
with which those who act in conformity with the function identify or
"count" individuals for policy purposes. The global welfare function
"reduces" counted individuals to their utility functions. That
reduction might not cohere very well with our view of distribuees if,
say, we construe them as boundedly responsible agents per the
emergent consensus discussed above in II.B. This points the way to a
second example that can instructively be compared to the utilitarian.
135. Though of course conceptual and idiomatic dexterity would be
required in many cases, in some of which there would be little more than
theoretical interest in the translation exercise.
136. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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Suppose we object, then, to utilitarianism by dint of the way
it construes us in our capacity as distribuees. What it had set before
us to maximize--"utility"-sounded inoffensive enough on first blush,
if for no other reason that it was vague and mysterious. But then we
find, upon further analysis, that what it effectively tells us to
equalize and identify ourselves with is out of sync with what we
know ourselves to be. It misidentifies that feature of ourselves in
virtue of which we legally and politically matter. How, then, to give
formal expression to our amended view of what law and policy should
be directed toward?
Here is the proverbial kicker: We can give formal expression
to what we take for a more satisfactory legal and policy imperative in
precisely the same schematic terms as the utilitarian did. We simply
convert what we take for the more appropriate form of individual-
identification and equalization-i.e., the better construal of
distribuees and distribuenda, into a maximizing formula. We
proceed, that is to say, from u* to u in this case, simply reversing the
order by which we arrived at utilitarianism's de facto u* in analyzing
its maximized sum of u's.
Let's trace the steps. Suppose we are opportunity-
egalitarians, per Part II.C.3. We wish, then, to equalize the
distribuendum discussed at Part II.A.3-material opportunity-over
distribuees whom we take for boundedly responsible agents, per
II.B.1. The latter are people who actively transform opportunities
into welfare. In transforming their opportunities into welfare, these
agents are in aggregate generating a form of global welfare. It is
what we can call "equal-opportunity-grounded welfare."
The latter, then, is precisely what we seek to see maximized.
Is it not? It is that maximandum which corresponds to what we take
for the appropriate equalisandum. The only difference between this
form of welfare and that of which utilitarians speak is that this form
proceeds from antecedent conditions of equal opportunity and is
produced in part by responsible agents.137 Utilitarian welfare, by
contrast, is indifferent to the opportunity backdrop and to the
responsible agency of distribuees. Its welfare aggregate is accordingly
137. The role played by the agents in generating the aggregate, in turn,
suggests that our task as an operational matter is to equalize opportunity,
leaving the transformation of that opportunity into welfare to the distribuees.
"Leave the driving to us," the distribuees might say. See infra Part III, in
connection with distribution mechanisms.
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differently generated, and is in that sense a different species of
welfare aggregate. Process is partly constitutive of product, we might
say. 138
This all suggests that the formal renditions of utilitarian and
opportunity-egalitarian norms can be rendered schematically
identical, and are themselves structurally identical.
Where they differ is, first, in utilitarianism's calling u* the
weighting assigned to individuals' exogenously endowed, birth-
conferred utility functions; while opportunity-egalitarianism calls u*
the material opportunity afforded those same individuals. They
differ, second, in utilitarianism's calling the u whose sum over
individuals is to be maximized "utility," a measure that is indifferent
to individuals' agency, responsibility, or opportunity; while
opportunity-egalitarianism calls that u "equal-opportunity-grounded"
welfare, a measure that is not thus indifferent.
The important point, then, is that both distribution formulae
maximize something, both equalize something, and in both cases we
can on pain of incoherence take the maximandum to be the right
thing to maximize if and only if we take the equalisandum to be the
right thing to equalize. It is worth noting a corollary while we are at
it here: There is much unnecessary confusion in the theoretical
literature concerning a putative distinction between the so-called
"consequentialist" nature of maximizing imperatives on the one
hand, and the "deontological" nature of fairness, or equalizing
imperatives on the other. 3 9 It even is claimed sometimes,
surprisingly, that norms of the latter sort are inherently "ex post" in
orientation, while those of the former sort are more "ex ante" in
orientation. 40  The ready interformulability of equalizing and
maximizing formulae immediately suggests that this distinction is
arbitrary. It is no more than an artifact of the symbolism we happen
to employ.
138. The description under which the product in question is individuated,
that is, includes essential reference to the generation-process. Process is
"internal" to product in such case. See supra note 8.
139. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 1, at 47-50 (observing that, despite
their disregard for consequentialist outcomes, such notions of fairness may have
broad appeal because of their "ex post perspective").
140. Id.
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This suggestion is borne out by the following consideration:
"Deontology" refers simply to the logic, or structure, of duty.
141
"Consequentialism" refers simply to the belief that consequences
matter. All imperatives, whether cast in maximization or
equalization terms, are laid down as duties. Functionaries are
obligated to "Max" this or "Eq" that.1 42 The duties, in turn, speak to
consequences. Utilitarianism lays down a duty to seek this
consequence: a maximized aggregate that is the sum of equally
weighted individual utility measures. Opportunity-egalitarianism
lays down a schematically identical duty to seek this substantively
alternative consequence: a fair distribution of material opportunity
such as results in a maximized aggregate of equal-opportunity-
grounded welfare. Both norms are as "consequentialist" as they are
deontic; they simply articulate duties to seek different
consequences. 
43
As for the putatively "ex post" orientation of "deontological"
norms and "ex ante" orientation of "consequentialist" norms, it is
difficult to know what to make of the claim. I doubt sense can be
made of it. I note, though, that opportunity-egalitarianism speaks
directly to the ex ante spread of opportunity, thereafter allowing the
ex post equal-opportunity-grounded welfare aggregate to "take care of
itself." It does so precisely because it is for agent distribuees to
produce that aggregate out of the antecedent opportunity spread.
Utilitarianism, by contrast, speaks directly to the ex post welfare
aggregate, without regard for the ex ante spread of opportunity over
responsible agents. Things look to be quite the reverse, then, of how
they have been characterized, assuming I have managed to make
sense of the characterization.
141. Id. at 42.
142. Id. at 4.
143. The term "consequentialism" as a name for utilitarian and cognate
maximizing imperatives seems to have been introduced by Gertrude E. M.
Anscombe. See Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 Phil. 1,
12 (1958). Anscombe was, to be sure, a remarkably penetrating thinker. But it is
tempting in hindsight to conclude that her singling out ethical systems by
reference to their attention to consequences has ultimately led to more muddling
mischief than salutary clarification.
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III. DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS
I noted earlier that "to distribute" is subject to two forms of
adverbial modification. One is by "ought" adverbs, which implicate
distribution formulae as discussed just above. The other is by "can"
adverbs, which implicate feasible distribution mechanisms, hence
institutions and laws. We proceed now to the latter. Treatment of
this subject receives a Part of its own because it is here, as we will
see, that the more "purely" theoretic concerns of Part II find detailed
application. In turning to distribution mechanisms we move from
"Grundnorms" to specifically legal norms-the stuff of customs,
treaties, statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions.
One might imagine many means by which to effect
distributions of benefit and burden. Such means might be specified,
in turn, at varying levels of abstraction. The possibilities here run
from micro-detailed descriptions of existing institutions, on up to the
quite broadly schematized designs contemplated in axiomatic
mechanism theory.'" Surprisingly, most normatively oriented legal
and policy analysts, domestic and international alike, have been
quiet on the subject of feasible distribution mechanisms. That is
regrettable for at least two reasons. For one thing, "can" limits
"ought," as is commonly recognized. Hence "ought" claims that ignore
"can" limitations risk being merely idle. And for another thing, some
"can's render some "ought"s particularly attractive. They do so not
merely by rendering option menus more manageable via elimination
of non-feasible alternatives, but also by highlighting ways we can
sidestep even some theoretic conundrums, as I shall demonstrate.
One distribution mechanism that I shall specify appears to
"fit" the most acceptable conceptions of distributor, distribuendum,
distribuee, and distribution formula discussed above in Part II very
gracefully and, as it happens, uniquely. That renders those
144. See, e.g., Louis J. Billera & Robert E. Bixby, A Characterization of
Pareto Surfaces, 41 Proc. Am. Math. Soc'y 261 (1973) (discussing the class of
market games without transferable utility); Ehud Kalai & Meir Smorodinsky,
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, 43 Econometrica 513 (1975)
(arguing, under four axioms that describe the behavior of the players, that there
is a unique solution to the two-person bargaining problem). For an overview of
axiomatic mechanism theory, pursuant to which institutions and markets are
schematically characterized in abstract terms, see, e.g., Roger B. Meyerson,
Mechanism Design, in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information and Markets
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989).
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conceptions more attractive on feasibility grounds, of course. But it
also does more than that. The process of schematizing and justifying
this mechanism further illuminates why those conceptions are
independently attractive in the first place.
I will begin, then, by briefly characterizing the rough-hewn,
composite mechanism-type that seems to be taken for granted as a
background condition by most legal and policy analysts. It amounts
to a vaguely specified mdlange of decentralized market allocation,
partly centralized private law rights-vindication by courts, and more
centralized ad hoc intervention by legislatures and regulatory
authorities. I will then briefly demonstrate a broad normative gulf
running between this composite and the naive maximization and
prioritization theories discussed in Part II. Those theories, that is to
say, are not equipped to underwrite specific prescriptions concerning
what precise shape the composite should take.
I will then show that the opportunity-egalitarian ideal does
recommend a particular, detailed configuration that the composite
mechanism should take. Indeed, I maintain, this configuration seems
even to constitute the institutional ideal toward which our more
public good oriented legal, policy, and institutional designing is
directed. The mechanism that is actually prescribed in detail by a
Part II distributive ethic is an ideal toward which we appear to have
been striving, with varying degrees of awareness, all along. I will call
it the ideal of an "efficient, democratically regulated, endowment-
neutral market."
A. Mechanisms, Laws, Governments, Intergovernmental
Organizations
Most who speak normatively with respect to distributive
questions take the following for granted: first, that most of the
material things that matter to people-the "resources" or "material
opportunities" of II.B above-are distributed by various forms of
private bequest and exchange. Also, the latter presuppose already
defined private law rights sounding in civil obligation-rights of
property, contract, and tort-all recognized by courts of law. Finally,
they take for granted that these rights are in turn subject to
occasional amendment or alteration by centralized legislative action.
Things seldom grow more fine-grained than this.'45
145. For example, not one of the sources cited supra Part II describes or
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What ever the reasons for or causes of this want of detail, the
consequences of mechanism-nonspecification are debilitating, both in
terms of implementation and for the theory itself. For distributive-
theory-building is, in its actuating ambition, institution-designing.
Without imagining in some detail what the "outward expression" of
prescriptive theory would look like, one remains unclear about what
actually is being prescribed. It is as though one were attempting to
think without language. Thought itself is left ill-formed and
inchoate.146 We find this in all of the leading distributive-ethical
theories currently on offer. What is missing in these theories comes
to light most starkly when we ask what it would be to instantiate
them. We can see this quite readily by briefly considering the best
known such theories-those considered above in Part II under the
previous distributive categories including distribuees, distribuenda,
distribution formulae, etc.
1. All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Utilitarianism
Consider first utilitarianism-i.e., nafve welfare
maximization. Collecting the information assembled in Part II, we
know that a utilitarian polity will wish to aggregate its patient-
distribuees' unweighted welfare outputs and maximize the resultant
sum. It will, moreover, be willing to do so "by any means necessary."
For the utility aggregate is the sole normative touchstone guiding
utilitarian policy, both as a matter of personal and of political
morality.
But now consider: in view of the difficulties noted in II.C to
afflict direct welfare-measurement, it is indeterminate what means
would suffice or be necessary. If you cannot know when utility is
maximized, can you know what to do in order to maximize it?
Notwithstanding that inconvenient question, the utilitarian will
regard a high degree of centralized government action as warranted
prescribes any distribution mechanism in more detail than just sketched.
146. Similar concerns animate Joseph Carens's and Robert Goodin's
interesting work on institutional design. See Joseph H. Carens, Equality, Moral
Incentives and the Market 3 (1981) (arguing that the conventional view of income
inequality as inevitable relies on a limited set of assumptions about human
motivation and politico-economic organization); Robert E. Goodin, Institutions &
Their Design, in The Theory of Institutional Design 34-37 (Robert E. Goodin ed.,
1998) (discussing presuppositions underlying the connection between descriptive
and prescriptive uses of design theory).
HeinOnline -- 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 399 2008-2009
400 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [40:343
and probably even required. For he will consider such authority to be
necessary both for the regular collection of utility data and for the
regular redistribution of holdings in order to maintain a maximal
aggregate utility reading. And he will take the utilitarian planner to
be unconstrained by any rights held antecedently by persons. 47 The
latter are utility-factories, not autonomous rights-bearing agents.
What is one to make of so dystopian and incoherent a
picture? A government stunningly empowered in principle, but one
that for theoretical reasons could not actually perform the function
for which it was empowered: all dressed up and no place to go. In
view of such difficulties as these, which are not merely implementary
but foundational, utilitarianism looks to be a nonstarter where
determinate distributive-ethical prescribing is concerned. It is
prescriptively sterile or stillborn au fond, and its advocates, in
leaving the mechanism variable unvalued, have served to conceal
that fact.
2. More Tastefully Dressed, Still No Destination:
Rawlsian Justice
Observations reminiscent of those made in connection with
utilitarianism hold true when considering Rawlsian justice theory.
Rawls himself was refreshingly candid about this. 148 He admitted
that his concern was solely with what he called "the basic structure"
of a just society.'4 9 The problem, alas, is that the structure he seems
to have had in mind is so basic that we do not know what Rawlsian
principles have to say about matters such as a society's constitutional
order itself, let alone subsequent legislation and private law
doctrine.'
50
147. The reason is that the utilitarian, as noted earlier, is concerned solely
with maximizing the utility aggregate, and indeed assigns legal rights with that
aim rather than fundamental rights in view. This is not even to mention
redistribution's effects on effort-expense, hence goods and services production,
hence the size of the utility aggregate itself. In view of utility's functioning as a
fetish, incidentally, the need for an extensive governmental apparatus should not
be surprising. In effect, the utility aggregate is a contemporary analogue to the
pyramids of Egypt and the ziggurats of Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica. Societies
organized around such monistic and inhuman pursuits have historically been
both theocratic and autocratic.
148. Rawls, Theory of Justice, supra note 64, at 19-24.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 176.
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Rawls left such matters for what he called later stages of
polity-constituting, with which his work was said not to be
immediately concerned.'51 There seems to have been a rough
expectation that there would be property rights and market
exchange.5 2 But Rawls claimed his principles would be realizable in
socialist societies as well.'53 We are accordingly left to wonder how
Rawls's principles might so much as even begin to be operationalized.
This raises a worry that the principles as articulated impart no
determinate prescriptive information. Note further that this is a
worry that already arose earlier, in connection with the
indeterminacy of "the worst off class" in Rawls's prescribed
distribution formula. 1
54
Thus, Rawls's theory so underdetermines its own
implementation that we do not know what to make of the theory
itself-or, perhaps better put, what to make with it. How much is it
actually telling us if it is equally realizable in any number of possible
polities, each with radically divergent property, tort, contract, and
other legal arrangements? Put differently, how do we recognize a
Rawlsian society upon seeing one?
3. Locally Determinate, Globally Indeterminate
Prescription: Normative "Law & Economics"
Apart from the opportunity-egalitarian mechanism I will
schematize below in Part III.B, the only serious mechanism-
proposals one finds in the distribution-concerned legal and policy
literatures are those done by normative economists of law.'55 Unlike
utilitarians and Rawlsians, these analysts generally attend carefully
to micro-institutional detail. They typically consider, for example,
whether a property rule or a liability rule, or perhaps some
particular default rule that forces a bargain, is apt to be wealth-
maximizing in the long term. Yet by what might at first blush seem a
curious irony, this is precisely their undoing from a distribution
mechanism point of view. In the end there is less irony here than at
first might appear, however. For the problem stems ultimately from
a gap between macro-objective and micro-detail akin to that which I
151. Id. at 175-76.
152. Id. at 239.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part II.D.2.
155. That is, practitioners of normative "law and economics."
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have just noted in Rawls. 15 6
The foundational mechanism problem for mainstream
economics of law is rooted in a fallacy of composition: Suppose that
each of n rules Ra/1, RaI2,... Ra/n tends, within the confines of its
particular domain 1, 2,... or n, to be wealth-maximizing in
comparison to its envisaged competitors b, c, d, etc. in that domain.'57
It does not follow from this that the full vector of rules Ra/1... Ra/n
will be wealth-maximizing as compared, say, to some other vector
Rb/1... Rb/n that would come to the theorist's mind only were he to
contemplate a fuller institutional backdrop. The latter is a backdrop
that is simply not on the agenda when all that is being asked is
which of Ral1, Rb/1,... Rm/1 is wealth-maximizing in domain 1
considered in isolation. In effect, practitioners of normative
economics of law consider domains one at a time, without reference
to other domains or to interactions between domains.
But realistically speaking, choices in nominally distinct
domains 1... n cannot reasonably be expected to be linearly
independent.'5 8 Rules within one domain will affect the distributive
consequences wrought by rules in other domains. It would
accordingly be dangerous to conclude from Ra / 's dominating Rb/1
in domain 1, that the full vector Ra / 1... Ra/n dominates Rb/1...
Rb in, let alone any other available vectors Rm /n.
As this discussion shows, there is a gap in economics of law
between wealth maximization on the macro level, and the evaluation
of our rules and institutions on the micro level. This gap is
"unbridgeable," because there is a "deep" foundational reason that
156. Rawls ignored micro in favor of macro, at macro's expense. Normative
economics of law ignores macro, we will see, at micro's expense.
157. Think of a "particular domain" as, for example, the question of what
kinds of damages should be available for a particular tort, or what rules should
constitute the "consideration" regime in contract, or what should be required of
pleadings in suits brought in fraud, etc. I designate such domains here with
numerals-i, 2, 3, etc., on up to n. I am then designating alternative proposed
rules within domains by lower case letters commencing with a. If 1 is the domain
of contract remedies, then, and a is specific performance, b is liquidated damages,
c is compensatory damages, etc. in that domain, then the rules to that effect are
here designated Ral1, Rb/i, etc. Shift to another domain 2-e.g., remedies for
battery-and lay out another menu of options a, b, c, etc., and there will be rules
with names Rb/1, Rb/2, etc.
158. Indeed normative "law and economics," like much of the
Marshallian/Pigouvian (as distinguished from Walrasian) welfare economics from
which it descends, is confined to partial equilibrium modes of analysis.
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normative economists of law consider domains in isolation rather
than in aggregate, a reason they cannot ignore without abandoning
their enterprise altogether: the reason is that normative economics of
law's guiding ideal-Kaldor-Hicksian "wealth-maximization"-is
itself normatively indeterminate in macro.15 9 One simply cannot
prescribe an initial distribution of entitlements on the basis of that
distribution's ultimate effect upon total "wealth."
This is because "wealth" cannot be so defined until after an
assignment of legal entitlements has already been carried out. This
is not an empirical accident; it is a conceptual, definitional truth.
There is no concept of "wealth" that is understandable apart from an
antecedent distribution of entitlements.1 60 Hence there is no "wealth"
aggregate to employ as a normative touchstone in deciding how best
to distribute those entitlements. 161 That means that normative
economics of law cannot prescribe a macro-distribution of legal
entitlements. 162 It is, in the end, as prescriptively sterile as are
utilitarianism and Rawlsianism.
159. For the seminal articles from which the pseudo-normative concept of
Kaldor-Hicksian "wealth" derives, see Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J. 549 (1939)
(arguing that an economist need not prove that no one will be worse off as the
result of a given policy to show that the policy is efficient); John R. Hicks,
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696 (1939) (arguing that a
proposed policy cannot be judged to maximize social welfare without taking
account of the policy's negative effects). An explanation of Kaldor-Hicksian
wealth is provided by Posner in the first edition of his Economic Analysis of Law.
See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 213-22 (1973) (stating that
wealth is that which is maximized when all goods are in the possession of those
who most value them).
160. The matter is ably treated in Coleman, supra note 85.
161. This is, in effect, a manifestation of the "Scitovsky Paradox"-the
possibility for two states of the world to be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one another.
See Scitovsky, supra note 85 and accompanying text. Note that utility, were it
measurable, would not be vulnerable on this score, even though it would be
fetishist for reasons provided supra Part II.C.
162. Posner, to his credit, accepted criticism to this effect early on. He then
claimed that the problem did not afflict what I am here calling the "micro" choice
problem of selecting between possible rules within a single, more limited domain.
But that is precisely what I am claiming here to be the problem for normative
economics of law from a mechanism-prescriptive point of view. If the macro
backdrop must be normatively evaluated, and such a task is literally impossible
using normative theory, one's micro-critiques have not been made normatively
intelligible.
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This fact is masked solely by restricting normative economics
of law to micro-distributions. Our attentions are thus deflected away
from the macro-distribution, and from the fact that normative
economics of law is conceptually incapable of evaluating that
distribution. And where macro-evaluation is impossible, micro-
evaluations lack ultimate normative content. They are in
consequence normatively uninteresting.
The reason is that they are conducted by reference to a
normatively arbitrary aggregate-the special form of "wealth"
invented by normative economics of law itself. That aggregate is
normatively arbitrary because it is produced against a normatively
arbitrary backdrop-i.e., on the basis of a distribution of entitlements
which, as previously discussed, economics of law simply lacks the
conceptual resources to evaluate and make recommendations about.
The "wealth" of normative economics of law is accordingly no more
ethically interesting than, say, the aggregate of "forehead height"
countenanced above.1
63
Yet again, then, insufficient attention paid to the un-
severable nature of practical distribution mechanisms with the
"purely theoretical" results in a gaping blind-spot. We fail to notice
that certain would-be distributive prescriptions are not merely
difficult to implement, but in fact misfire at the stage of prescription
itself. We get nowhere-we do not even point anywhere-until we
work completely to specify valuations of all of the variables opened by
distributive infinitives at once.
B. One Satisfactory Mechanism
The previous subsection might seem to underwrite
pessimism. One might fear, given the failings of normative
distributional theories thus far, that the problem is simply
intractable. But fear not. There is a mechanism that determinately
realizes the best vector of values proffered in Part II to fill the
distributive variables. Intriguingly, moreover, this fact does not seem
to be mere happy accident: analyzing this mechanism's ability to
vindicate the values discussed supra, also shows the independent
attractiveness of the values themselves. That is an attraction
additional to the practical advantages offered by this mechanism's
capacity to realize the best valuations. What is more, I shall indicate,
163. See supra note 16.
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our laws, policies, and institutions appear to be animated, at least in
part, by a shared societal commitment to realizing precisely this
mechanism.
1. One Fully Specifiable Mechanism: Real
Opportunity-Spreading
To envision the mechanism I have in mind, begin by
assuming a "complete" market. That is a forum in which all and only
desired, voluntary trading occurs."M Assume that this trading is in,
first, all goods and services that can practically be made available
and that anyone values. These would be, in the terms of Part II.C
above, all things that are intelligible as normatively interesting
distribuenda.165 Assume that the trading is in, second, "Arrow
securities." 166 These are contingent claims to compensation upon the
occurrence of certain events that distribuees might disvalue. The
164. Market "completeness" in this sense includes trading in contingent
claims, which I will discuss in the next several paragraphs. I will also argue that
completeness in this sense is a function, in part, of what I shall presently label
"neutrality," a fact which appears to go largely ignored. For the classic sources on
the role of contingent claims in completing markets, see John R. Hicks, Value and
Capital 2 (1940) (comprising the study of the interrelations and mutual
interactions of markets); see also Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value 28-103 (1954)
(explaining how prices and commodities are affected by private agents of free
markets); Maurice Allais, Ggndralisation des Thdories de L'Equilibre Economique
Gdndral et du Rendement Global au Cas du Risque, 11 Econometrie, Colloques
Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 81 (1953);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-
bearing, 31 Rev. Econ. Stud. 91, 91-96 (1964) (discussing the effect of risk-
bearing on markets and securities). Completeness is more precisely characterized
by formal means. Its presence bears many ramifications, only some of which can
be treated here. For more complete treatment, see Robert Hockett, Just
Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging, 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l. Econ. L. 107, 114
(2004) (assessing the systemic and social roles of risk and insurance in a new
global economy); see also Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 1 Theory of
Incomplete Markets 1 (1996) (developing an equilibrium model for how agents
deal with imperfections and uncertainties in markets).
165. Assume also, for obvious reasons, that valued "goods" and "services"
do not include among them the nonconsensual expropriation of others'
entitlements, which would violate the neutrality conditions that I describe later. I
will also explain how to apportion and determine entitlements, and that which
counts as expropriation.
166. The term has entered common welfare economics language as a result
of its origin in Arrow, supra note 164. See generally Hockett, Just Insurance
Through Global Macro-Hedging, supra note 164.
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compensation is payable by anyone willing to take the opposite side
of what amount to "bets" on the disvalued contingencies. 67 In effect,
then, they are "mini-insurance policies."
Assume next that the market I describe also is "neutral."
Each participant enters it with an initial endowment of ethically
exogenous assets, the "material opportunities" of Part II.C.2, which
are equal in value to that with which everyone else enters it. Call
this form of neutrality entry neutrality.
The market I have in mind also is neutral in a second sense.
Regulatory norms prevent such strategically opportunistic behavior
as can yield a particular consequence. Market participants may not
come to possess greater or lesser holdings, or price-affecting demand
powers, than those traceable to (a) the participants' ethically
exogenous initial endowments, and (b) their ethically endogenous, or
responsible, transaction histories. Call this form of neutrality process
neutrality. 68 It is the sort of neutrality that Europe's "competition
law," and America's "antitrust law," are each meant to maintain.
This mechanism straight-forwardly instantiates a particular
set of valuations of the distributive variables discussed above at
Parts II.A through II.D. It also, simultaneously, sidesteps the three
critical measurement concerns discussed at Part II.C, in a manner
that no other mechanism so much as begins to attempt.
First, I will discuss this system's valuations of the
distributive variables. Note first that the mechanism honors
distribuees as boundedly responsible agents, as characterized above
in Part II.B.1. Distribuees transact voluntarily pursuant to their
own, autonomous relative valuations of material goods, ills, and
contingencies that they prefer and disprefer. What they hold or enjoy
at any given moment is, moreover, a function of those same
autonomous valuational and transacting decisions.
Note next that the mechanism treats as distribuenda
whatever non-neutrality-violative goods or services, including risk-
bearing services, the agent-distribuees themselves value or disvalue.
167. See Robert Hockett, Gaming as Micro-Insurance: How and Why to
Regulate, not Eliminate, Online Gambling (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author).
168. Please set aside, just for the moment, the questions of means by which
endowments would be measured and endowment-equalization effected. We will
get to those shortly.
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These goods and services are the resources or material opportunities
countenanced above in II.C.2 and II.C.3. They are that from which, in
conjunction with their choices, distribuees derive welfare.
Note finally that the mechanism, via the entry neutrality
imposed upon it at the outset and the process neutrality retained
throughout, equalizes what is ethically exogenous, or that which is
not traceable in the holding directly to a responsible choice. At the
same time, it allows holdings over time to vary with ethically
endogenous, or responsible, transactional and other decisions. The
distribution formula to which the mechanism gives expression, then,
is the opportunity-egalitarian formula characterized above in Part
II.D.3.
As we proceed to measurement challenges, note first that the
mechanism sidesteps the problem of cardinal welfare measurement
discussed at II.C. 1. It does so by enabling agent-distribuees, via their
voluntary trading activity, to maximize welfare in a manner
consistent with two conceptually equivalent, normatively required
conditions: (1) ethically exogenous endowment equality among
market participants, per the opportunity-egalitarian requirement
characterized in Part II.D.3; and (2) an equally shared scarcity of the
exogenously given resources from which agents "produce" their own
welfare.169 Note that the maximization of this normatively intelligible
169. In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by so-called
"equal division Walrasian equilibria," or "EDWEs." The technical literature on
the theory of EDWEs and fair allocation more generally is vast, though curiously
ignored by economically-oriented legal academics. For a canonical sampling, see
Terrence E. Daniel, A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. Econ.
Theory 94 (1975) (developing a concept of equity as a measure of the
distributional equity of allocations in private goods economies with production);
Duncan Foley, Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, 7 Yale Econ. Essays 45,
45-98 (1967); Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent
Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity, 92 Q.J. Econ. 1, 1 (1978)
(attempting to define economic justice through numerical and mathematical
terms); Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the Concept of
Fairness, 41 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 441, 441-43 (1974) (raising a new difficulty
concerning the possibility of satisfying Pareto efficiency and equity goals
simultaneously); Hal R. Varian, Equity, Envy and Efficiency, 9 J. Econ. Theory
63, 63-91 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Two Problems in the Theory of Fairness, 5 J.
Pub. Econ. 249 (1976) (evaluating equity and fairness in a pure exchange
economy). The work from which these studies depart is Leon Walras, Elements of
Pure Economics (William JaffM trans., 1954) (1844) (providing an assessment of
the balance of social, psychological, and economic incentives in industry). Walras
appears to have anticipated, indeed even inchoately to have intended, precisely
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form of welfare'7 ° is effectively "guaranteed" to occur: That is a
straight-forward entailment, in the present context, of the "first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
Now note that, similarly, the mechanism unobjectionably
sidesteps the problem of interpersonal welfare comparison discussed
at Part II.C.1. So long as the material opportunity components of
welfare-manufacture1 7'  are counted 73  among the exogenous
endowments that must be equalized over participants, the following
will hold true: Whatever the absolute or comparative quanta of
welfare enjoyed by distribuees, these will be the "highest" that they
can be (as consistent with Part II.D.3's opportunity-egalitarian
distribution formula and the resulting equally-shouldered
constraints posed by the environment).
Finally, the mechanism "automatically" commensurates
distribuenda, per the discussion of Part II.C.2, in the only way that
ethically matters, via the implicit comparative valuations of
autonomously transacting agent-distribuees.174 We need not concern
ourselves with how much of some good G2 "would" or "will"
compensate person P1 for a deficit of good G1, let alone seek to
construct a "perfectionist" index of all such goods and ills.' 75 Our
distribuees themselves will, in effect, autonomously and with equal
such developments in addressing interests of efficiency and equity. See Willam
Jaff6's Essays on Walras 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983) (showing Walras's
desire to define social justice and social utility through economics and
mathematical equations).
170. For a reminder of the contrasting, normatively unintelligible form of
welfare, see supra Introduction and Part II.C.1.
171. See Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of
Classical Welfare Economics, in Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium
on Mathematical Statistics and Probability 507, 507 (1951).
172. These material opportunity components include physiological
determinants.
173. For example, in the form of drugs, prostheses, or contingent claims to
those and other forms of compensation to equalize material opportunity.
174. See Hockett & Risse, supra note 64.
175. Id. The claim that the need to index commits one to perfectionism-
the proposition that some goods are inherently more worthy of collective pursuit
than others-figures into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian primary goods
leveled by Arneson. See Arneson, supra note 113, at 445-46 (1990) (arguing that
there really is no alternative to subjectivist standards of distributive justice that
let the valuation of resource shares depend on the evaluation that each individual
herself gives to her share). The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, supra
note 64.
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voice construct the only normatively salient index, which is, in effect,
a spontaneously emergent price index. And so long as entry and
process neutrality are maintained, this latter amounts to the
ethically relevant "global" valuation of goods and ills. That is a
valuation in which each participant has exercised an equal "vote."'
17 6
Prices, then, in a market bearing the "completeness" and "neutrality"
attributes discussed above, will be what the Medievals long sought
but never found-"just prices."
2. Instantiability-Challenges and Ordered "Nth
Bests"
The opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism, then, insofar
as it can be instantiated, simultaneously assists in realizing what
looks to be the most plausible vector of Part II distributive values
while also meeting or neutralizing each of the principal measurement
challenges. Moreover, the ways in which it does so serve to reinforce
the values discussed in Part II, including distributors and distribuees
as boundedly responsible agents, distribuenda as material
opportunities, and distribution formulae as opportunity-egalitarian.
Three obstacles might seem to stand in the way of the
mechanism's realization. Dispatching them will be necessary if we
are to be confident that opportunity-egalitarianism is any more
practicable, or even prescriptively determinate, than its competitors
addressed in III.A. The process of addressing the challenges,
however, ends up affording affirmative advantages as well. For in
addressing them we come to notice that the mechanism actually
amounts to a normative refinement and completion of the mechanism
specified by the economics of law. In addition, we will learn that the
mechanism is progressively instantiable over time, in a manner that
ordinally replicates a normative scale from "nth best" to "first best."
We find that our laws, policies, and institutions appear to be
actuated by the implicitly shared goal of ascending that scale. 177 And
176. Again, provided that there exist market completeness and neutrality
in the senses explicated above. Trading here is voting, and voting rights are
equally spread in the only sense that ethically matters: equal bargaining power
involving the apposite form of equality, viz., equality of ethically exogenous
endowments.
177. Hence, we will see reason to displace even "positive" economics of law
with a more convincing picture.
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finally, we realize that there are means by which to more fully realize
the mechanism that we are not yet employing.
I will specify and then address each of the challenges in serial
order. I will note the aforementioned "fringe benefits" that
addressing these challenges produces as they are implicated.
The first challenge arises in connection with market-
neutrality, and in particular with entry-neutrality. If we are to
equalize holdings of the material opportunity endowments with
which agent-distribuees enter the market, we must presumably
commensurate those endowments. But how are we to do that prior to
the operation of the market mechanism when it is the market itself
that affords the ethically satisfactory method of commensuration? Is
there not a pragmatic indeterminacy at work that is just as vitiating
as the indeterminacies of utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice theory, and
normative economics of law?
The answer is no. To show why not, we proceed in three
steps. First, we demarcate certain classes of material opportunity
endowment that are unambiguously ethically exogenous in the
holding. We will call these "core endowments." Second, we indicate
the means by which the holding of those core endowments can be
readily equalized. Finally, we show that any forward movement in
these directions is unambiguous movement toward the ethically
optimal distribution. The ideal mechanism is straightforwardly
approached in a continuously upward-sloped fashion.
First, then, we must address the core endowments. At least
four classes of endowment are uncontroversially ethically exogenous
in the holding, the most obvious being the genetic determinants of
successful welfare-pursuit. Just as many handicaps are obvious and
incontestably undeserved, many talents are likewise incontestably
unearned. The advance of empirical science enables us to grow ever
more able to sort out, at least probabilistically, what is predisposed
and what is not. The second includes both childhood healthcare and
education. Children do not earn or deserve greater or lesser access to
such assets, particularly when they are very young. Their degrees of
responsibility gradually grow as they move toward adulthood. The
third category encompasses inherited nonhuman capital, or money-
valued wealth. Like other forms of inheritance, this one is morally
arbitrary, and it does not grow less so with time and maturation.
Finally, the fourth class includes opportunity to shed or share
unforeseeable risk through trade or collective risk-pooling action.
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This is best seen as non-confiscatory compensation for deficits in
other resources or material opportunities. 7
Core endowments of these types not only are manageable in
number, but with the advance of empirical science are also growing
more readily quantifiable, directly allocable, and indeed allocable
equitably. They are also in little, if any, need of commensuration
inter se. Moreover, if we distinguish between beneficial and
burdensome endowments we see that this is particularly so of the
beneficial ones: early education, healthcare, and inherited non-
human capital. The burdensome endowments are somewhat more
difficult, since they disproportionately include physiological
resources. But they, too, are far from unmanageable.
The hardest of the latter is genetically poor health or
handicap. Some such deficiencies can be valued by reference to
current prices affixed to their mitigation- prostheses, or medicines.
There seems to be no harm in beginning to address such deficits with
compensation equal to the going rates. Other such deficits are not so
readily mitigated. With those deficits, the best that we can do is to
estimate the compensation afforded by insurance policies that
typically are, or perhaps "would," be purchased against such
contingencies were they available.17 9
178. Some seek to include the presence of counter-traders in the
opportunity set here. See, e.g., Colin M. MacCleod, Liberalism, Justice, and
Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality 13-16 (1998) (arguing that society must
have a non-market account of the "circumstances of authenticity," or the social
conditions under which we form preferences and beliefs about the good, before
determining the proper role of the market, and that society should be more aware
of the many ways in which real world markets fall short of meeting the demands
of justice); Markovits, supra note 36. I think this position is mistaken-in effect, a
retreat from the position from which one treats distribuees as responsible
agents-by dint of its treating co-persons and their responsible tastes as
resources. I count only infrastructure.
179. See Hockett, Whose Ownership, supra note 123, at 217-37; Dworkin,
supra note 36, at 307-50. Real, rather than "hypothetical," such insurance is
proposed in Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 164; Alexander Tabarrok,
Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 Contingencies 20 (1997) (exploring the
possibility of "genetic insurance" to insure against possessing "bad" genes, which,
if possessed, would allow for provision of compensation); see also John H.
Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 445, 446-50
(1995) (proposing a system of time-consistent insurance contracts that use
severance payments to insure people from overly expensive health care or denial
of coverage due to long-term illnesses).
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Clearly there is some guesswork here, but it need not be
whistling in the dark. With the growth of empirical knowledge we
grow better at estimating with greater reliability. We do what we can
to repair the ship at sea, if I may borrow Neurath's old simile. 8 ° The
more such repairing we do, the more capable the mechanism grows
at improving itself.
The first challenge to mechanism-instantiability, as we saw
above, concerns neutrality, but the second concerns completeness. It
asks: Is it reasonable to require that "all and only desired trading"
occur? Is that possible, and should we even wish it? Would not we
have to abandon our market-inalienability norms and "commodify"
everything?'.' And if we do not do that, can the opportunity-
egalitarian market mechanism that I have described discharge the
tasks I have assigned it?
This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to
neutrality. To begin with, consider the core opportunity endowments
again. Each of these is already subject, in principle, to
unobjectionable market-valuability. We have already "commodified"
what most needs commodifying here.
Next consider what else might be traded, which includes all
that enters into responsible agent-distribuees' welfare-pursuits. It is
easy enough simply to bracket out of market transactions such
things, which, in our estimation, should not be commodified-babies,
blood, or human organs, for example-and still approximate to
180. For Neurath's simile, see 2 Otto Neurath, Gesammelte okonomische,
soziologische und sozialpolitische Schriften 215-16 (R. Hailer et al. eds., 1988).
181. For the classic contemporary objection to "commodification," see
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1849-52
(1987) (exploring the significance of market-inalienability and its justifications,
and offering her own theory that relates it to an ideal of human flourishing); see
also Michael Sandel, Public Philosophy (2005) (arguing that individual rights and
freedom of choice do not by themselves provide an adequate ethic for a democratic
society but rather must be joined with a politics of citizenship, community and
civic virtue). Contemporary protests of commodification revive concerns raised
repeatedly in the past. For two classic Victorian-era objections, see Thomas
Carlyle, Past and Present (Robert Thorne ed., 1890) (contrasting the life of his
contemporaries, driven by impersonal economic forces and abstract theories of
human "rights" and natural "laws" with the lives of medieval abbots whose
monastic communities were unified by human and spiritual values); John
Ruskin, Unto This Last and Other Writings 155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985)
(attacking laissez-faire capitalism to propose a theory of political economy which
provides moral constraints on wealth accumulation).
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distributing goods and services as best permitted. For again, as I will
show, there are "second" down to "nth best" distributive
arrangements, ordered equivalently to degrees of neutrality and
completeness. 182
That is the desirability side of the "completeness" challenge.
The feasibility question asks the following: Is it reasonable to
suppose that all parcelings of ownable and tradable goods, and that
payment-claims defined in terms of all specifiable contingencies,
might be made tradable? Can we really "complete" markets in the
sense one would require?183 Here the problem, the guise of which is
more technital than the alienability guise, can be handled in three
ways.
The first way is to note that it is by now a well-established
theorem of general equilibrium-and stochastic calculus-rooted
financial theory-that complete markets can be simulated through a
comparatively small number of hedging strategies.184 Moreover, the
number of contingent claims that can be made tradable is growing
almost by the day. I exploit those facts elsewhere. 85 So we can do a
lot more completing than we have done thus far.
The second and third ways of addressing the completeness
challenge are more immediately satisfying. For one thing, greater
entry-neutrality itself yields greater completeness. This is so because
182. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978) (analyzing whether the regulation of
baby selling is economically sound, and exploring alternatives as to how a market
in babies would function). The blood and human organ allusion is to the well-
known Titmuss example. See Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From
Human Blood to Global Policy (1970) (postulating that altruistic behavior can
account for the greater prevalence of blood donation in Britain than in the United
States).
183. Thank you to Henry Hansmann for first pressing me on this score.
184. See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty:
The Continuous-Time Case, 51 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 247, 247 (1969); Robert C.
Merton, Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model,
3 J. Econ. Theory 373, 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton, Continuous-Time Portfolio
Theory and the Pricing of Contingent Claims (Sloan School of Management, MIT,
Paper No. 881-76, 1976).
185. See Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 164, at 114-15; Robert
Hockett, What Kinds of Stock-Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs,
Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies," 92 Cornell L. Rev. 865, 945 (2007)
(describing how American ownership of business stocks can, and should be, as
widespread as homeownership).
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completeness rides, in part, upon all desired trading being available.
Furthermore, more trades per unit of wealth occur at lower levels
along personal wealth curves. Lastly, entry neutrality accordingly
opens market doors to larger numbers of participants who enter at
the low end. Hence greater entry neutrality results in more trade.
For another thing, the completeness-feasibility problem has
no more than an illusory "bite" here. For, as my answer to the third,
and final, challenge will show, more complete and more neutral
always means more consistent with an opportunity-egalitarian
allocation: There is an ordered set of "nth bests" that is equivalent to
the set of "more" complete and "more" neutral markets. Let me, then,
turn to the third challenge.
Suppose you cannot achieve full completeness and neutrality
of the sort that characterizes the ideal mechanism. In that case,
might you not in seeking merely more completeness and neutrality
than you presently have, ironically end up farther from your ideal
end-state? Has not Hart, for example, proved that the move from less
to more complete markets short of full completeness can incur
Pareto-losses?
186
The suggestion, then, is that ascending degrees of
completeness and neutrality might not be ordinally equivalent to a
scale of nth bests. The suggestion happens to be false. The intuitive
reply is that the suggestion turns crucially on a normatively
uninteresting conception of efficiency. Indeed it turns on the Pareto
and Rawlsian theories that we have already found, in effect, to be
ethically noncognizable above at Parts II.D.1 and III.A.3.
"Efficiency," in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the
maximization of output given a stipulated input, or the minimization
of input given a stipulated output. It means roughly "more for the
same" or "the same for less." The more technical understandings of
"efficiency" familiar to welfare economists and normative economists
of law amount to variations on that theme.
Pareto-efficient distributions of goods or ills to persons are
best understood, intuitively, as distributions where the derived
186. See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the
Market Structure is Incomplete, 11 J. Econ. Theory 418, 431 (1975) (arguing that
"[i]f the economy contains more than one good or lasts for more than two periods,
then an equilibrium generally will not even be Pareto optimal relative to the set
of competitive equilibria[]").
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quasi-aggregated preference-satisfactions cannot be raised without
lowering the individual preference of at least one person."8 7 That is
the sense in which it amounts to a form of "efficiency," the one sense
in which it can warrant the use of that word. Pareto efficiency is the
maximization of aggregate preference-satisfaction as constrained by
a polity-conferred "veto."8 8 In this case the veto is that wielded by
any distribuee-including a thief, per the discussion in Part II.C.1-
who stands to suffer a satisfaction loss in consequence of some social
restriction.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday
understanding of "efficiency." The reason is that it is unapologetically
aggregative rather than quasi-aggregative. Distributions are efficient
in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if there is no departure from them that
would render some parties' aggregated gains greater than other
parties' aggregated losses. 189 The guiding intuition, then, again, is
that the scalar welfare output of a given wealth-distributive input
vector is, given the individual welfare functions (input vector
components) that we have to work with, the "highest" it can be.' 90
But now consider what this means. It means that Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency alike are forms of "naive maximization," in
the parlance of Part II.D.1. They are in consequence normatively
inert. Their maximanda--distributive-ethically unfiltered preference
satisfaction in the one case, and opportunity-indifferent "wealth" in
the other-are ethically irrelevant magnitudes. They are no better
than, say, forehead height.
Efficiency on either the Paretian or the Kaldor-Hicksian
scale, then, is devoid of normative interest. For the only form of
welfare that matters is what we called in Part II.D "equal-
opportunity-grounded welfare." The only form of efficiency that
matters, accordingly, is the form that maximizes this form of welfare.
And the maximization of this form of welfare, as we saw in Part
II.D.3, "takes care of itself' as we work to equalize the distribuendum
that is material opportunity over the distribuees who are boundedly
187. See generally Hockett, supra note 13.
188. Id.
189. See Kaldor supra note 159; see also Hicks supra note 159.
190. One "produces" welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by
distribution operations. Those are the variable inputs, so to speak, while persons'
utility functions are the fixed inputs.
HeinOnline -- 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 415 2008-2009
416 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [40:343
responsible agents.1 9' Because it is normatively uninteresting, the
third challenge facing the opportunity-egalitarian market
mechanism simply evaporates.
92
3. The Role of Law
Among the advantages offered by reflecting upon how to
instantiate that distribution mechanism which gives best expression
to the most plausible distributive ethic is the following: we notice in
doing so that the laws, policies, and institutions typically
encountered in the advanced political-economies seem intended in
large part to foster and buttress some such mechanism as that which
I have just sketched and defended. 93 Thinking along the lines of
Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2 above, then, offers further advantages.
First, it will enable us better to interpret our own legal
traditions, and thus to extend the tradition in a manner more in
keeping with its own animating ideals. Relatedly, it will position us
to improve the laws, policies, and institutions that we have, with a
view to rendering the resultant mechanism both more complete and
more neutral, hence more fully in keeping with its own opportunity-
egalitarian ideal. And third, by way of theoretic side-benefit, it will
better enable us to see what mainline economics of law has right and
has wrong, and thus fashion that discipline in a more effective
manner. Let me, then, at least preliminarily bear out the interpretive
claim.
Much familiar private law doctrine across modern
jurisdictions seems to be transparently opportunity-egalitarian,
emphasizing individual responsibility. Consider, for example, the
191. Recall that the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula laid out
in Part II.D.3 requires not only that ethically exogenous holdings of that from
which ethically endogenous wealth and welfare are derived-material
opportunity, "Ri"-be equalized; it also requires that ethically endogenous such
holdings--"Ei"--be left to vary with the responsible choices that produce them.
192. The third challenge should not be confused with another possible
challenge-that some means of affording more completeness or neutrality in one
sphere of activity might lessen the degree of completeness or neutrality in
another. To what extent such interactions occur is an empirical question, not one
of "high theory." I will address this question below in connection with the matter
of comparative institutional competencies.
193. We might say, then, that .early normative economics of law was
positively incorrect in a manner precisely analogous to that in which it was
normatively incorrect.
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concept of "diligence" across property, contract, and tort in common
law, civil law, and modern "hybrid" legal traditions. Likewise, the
concept of adverse possession in most property regimes, mitigation of
damages in most contract regimes, and comparative negligence in
most tort regimes, emphasizes accountability. Even the presumption
in favor of contractual freedom found in most modern legal systems
seems rooted in respect for autonomy, or responsible agency.
In remedies, concern for "making the plaintiff whole" per the
compensatory damages regime looks straight-forwardly actuated by
considerations of corrective justice: it is a matter of equalizing
present circumstances to a status quo ante. And the many doctrines
of equity jurisprudence that pervade our law are of course
transparently exogenous circumstance equalizing and responsibility
vindicating in nature, as both the term "equity" and its Thomist-
Aristotelian roots would have led one to anticipate.
Public law, too, is best viewed as an attempt to afford
something like greater neutrality and completeness of the sorts I
have assayed just above. Laws prohibiting invidious discrimination
on the basis of racial, gender, and other ineluctable or morally
arbitrary traits, for example, look to be straightforward cases of
process-neutrality-promotion. Public education and sundry forms of
government-facilitated global insurance for their parts are aimed at
promoting entry-neutrality. They work to equalize ethically
exogenous material opportunity endowments-the "Ri" of Part II.D.3.
Moreover, such neutrality-boosting measures, for reasons noted
earlier, tend to enhance market completeness as well.
There are other completeness-enhancing measures that
advanced political economies have taken steadily over the past
decades and even centuries. The trend with respect to
"commodification," for example, seems by and large to have been to
permit, and indeed in many cases even to foster, the trading of more
and more goods and services, including contingent claims. Witness
government encouragement of secondary debt "securitization"
markets in the United States since the 1930s, for example, as well as
its funding much research that has led to the design of derivative
securities. 194
194. See, e.g., Hockett, Just Insurance, supra note 164; see also Hockett, A
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 123.
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The "commodification" trend has led to "unbundling" more
and more once-conjoined items into separately traded items.195
Conspicuous cases of such market-fostering include government
regulatory and start-up support for active markets in securities,
derivatives, and more recently, pollution rights trading. 196
Conspicuous cases of mandated unbundling, which incidentally show
again the linkage between neutrality and completeness, include
antitrust action against large telecommunications concerns in the
1980s and software manufacturers in the 1990s. 97
The fact that such measures can often be argued to enhance
aggregate global welfare, as well as wealth or consumer surplus,
should not surprise us. Nor should it be taken for unalloyed
indication that legislatures or common law judges do, let alone ought,
to craft law, doctrine, or policy with a view to maximization alone. All
the less should it be taken for encouragement to conceive
"improvements" we think likely more fully to effect aims of that sort.
For we have seen now that opportunity-indifferent aggregate-
maximizing is normatively empty. And we have seen that equal-
opportunity-grounded maximizing nevertheless overlaps in part,
short of full coextension, with other forms of maximizing.
98
That fact itself explains how "positive" economists of law in
the past were able to suppose common law judges subconsciously
actuated by Kaldor-Hicksian wealth-maximizing aims. We would
effectively fine-tune mainline economics of law, then, by interpreting
our legal arrangements as effectuating the responsible agency, equal
opportunity ideal. We should, in turn, frame our own efforts at
improvement of our laws and institutions in keeping with the same
objective.
If I am correct in what I suggest here, then a substantial new
research agenda is opened for what might be called an "ethically
intelligible economics of law." Some actual or proposed rules thought
to be wealth-maximizing, for example, will prove suboptimal in light
of the opportunity-egalitarian ideal. Responsive amendments to such
195. See, e.g., Magill & Quinzii, supra note 164.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, U.S. versus Microsoft: The Horizon, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1999, at Al; Leslie Wayne, A.T. & T.'s New Challenges, N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1982, at D1.
198. Recall that EDWEs, for example, happen also to be Pareto-efficient, as
observed supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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rules might carry us towards realizing the ideal mechanism I have
schematized. Parallel remarks of course hold true of our efforts to
interpret and extend the rules that we have, as well as to formulate,
legislate, and administratively implement the best new policies and
programs possible.
4. Comparative Legal & Institutional Competencies
I should, in closing this discussion of distribution
mechanisms, perhaps say a few words about what I am not claiming.
Certainly I do not mean to suggest that domestic or world courts
should attempt to make general determinations of litigants' overall
material opportunity allotments in deciding cases. Even less do I
mean to imply that they should allow such determinations to enter
into decisions as to who should prevail in litigated cases, as if courts
were engines of non-case-specific compensation or distribution. Nor
do I intend here to recommend that legislators, policy-makers, or
treaty-negotiators as a general rule prescribe that persons who fare
unjustifiably poorly in one sphere of activity be held to different
standards in other spheres of activity, in order that they may be
compensated overall.
My gut intuition, which I take to be widely shared, 99 runs in
the other direction. It is that the integrity and longterm stability of
institutions operating in the many different "spheres" of activity that
jointly constitute a pluralist global society require we not typically
determine individuals' outcomes in one sphere by reference to their
outcomes in other spheres.20 0 Hence my intuition is that full
opportunity-equality among persons requires our working
severally-but simultaneously-toward opportunity-equality sphere
199. Indeed, I take the intuition to be broadly Toquevillean, and perhaps in
that sense particularly "American."
200. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Local Justice 133 (1993) (stating that "[tihere is
no mechanism for redress across allocative spheres[]"); Alistair McIntyre, After
Virtue 253 (1979) (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for fairness by
even-handedness in the Bakke case); David Miller, Principles of Social Justice 78
(1999) ("Thus, the claims of need will always be vulnerable to challenge by the
claims of desert once we move outside a small-group context."); Michael Walzer,
Spheres of Justice 10 (1983) (arguing that, though there is no single standard
against which all distributions are measured, there is a relative autonomy among
different distributive spheres); H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice 6
(1994) ("Society makes no effort to coordinate distributive decisions across
different domains, nor would it make sense to try.").
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by sphere. I say severally, for the sake of the institutional integrity of
each sphere. But simultaneously, because the opportunity-
egalitarian ideal is best realized in each when well realized in all.20'
But this is, alas, not the place either to commit to or argue for these
provisional judgments. More is required to think through the
question effectively than space permits here.
My claim here is more modest. It is simply that, where
domestic or international rules, programs, or policies are crafted, the
crafting ought to be done with equal regard for persons conceived as
boundedly responsible agents. That is the first, fundamental right
that every person on the globe should be regarded as bearing. It is
the secular legal analogue to that "sacredness" that most of us regard
as inherent in each of us.
Because it calls for treating one another as equal rights-
endowed, boundedly responsible agents, my argument requires that
judges, legislatures, executives, administrative agencies, and
institutions view their roles slightly differently than they do at
present. They are to equalize (a) such benefits and burdens as they
are themselves institutionally authorized to bestow and (b) such
benefits and burdens as are ethically exogenous in the holding by the
persons in regard to whom they are acting. At the same time, they
are to dispense in proportion to differential responsibility such
ethically endogenous benefits and burdens as they are institutionally
authorized to effectively bestow. One entailment of this latter claim,
in light of the foregoing subsections, is that legal doctrine and
legislative policy ought generally to be elaborated with a view to
broadening the reach and improving the operation of the distribution
mechanism I have schematized.
These observations bear some possible implications for a thus
far inconclusive discussion on institutional roles taking place in the
legal-economic literature. One strand of this discussion has it that
courts are better suited to maximizing aggregate wealth in the
incremental crafting of legal doctrine, while distributional concerns
are more efficiently handled through tax policy. 20 2 While I must defer
201. For the reasons behind this assertion, see Part III.A.3 in connection
with the non-independence of domains.
202. For recent discussion of this long-contested claim, see, e.g., Chris W.
Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable
View, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 797, 820 (2000) (challenging the traditional notion that
legal rules cannot address distributional concerns by showing that both tax policy
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more complete discussion of such matters to another venue, two
comments can be offered preliminarily.
First, in light of what has emerged over the previous pages,
the "efficiency" appealed to in these debates simply will not be of
normative interest if decoupled from the responsible agency, equal
material opportunity ideal. Second, assigning distributional tasks to
certain policy arenas, while designating maximizing tasks to another,
raises considerable and possibly inescapable risks. One is that the
normatively intelligible maximandum itself cannot be identified
apart from the equal material opportunity backdrop against which
maximizing activity by a responsible agent takes place. Another is
that the institutional decoupling of welfare or income reward from
discrete transactional settings tends to undermine the continued
practice of responsible agency itself.
A practical corollary to the above discussion involves
incentivizing responsible agency. Indeed, rewards to responsible
agents should follow as proximately to particular exercises of such
responsibility as possible. The want of precisely this form of
proximity is one of the flaws that we found to undermine the veiled-
choice distribution scenarios, such as Rawls's, addressed supra. In
contrast, the opportunity-egalitarian framework ties minute-by-
minute distributive changes as closely as possible to the voluntary
transactions that immediately produce them.
CONCLUSION
We have covered much ground here. Notwithstanding our
progress, it is clear that much more has to be done. Indeed, if I am
right, there is more to be done than we have yet realized. For it
seems that where the normative theory of law's links to economics is
concerned, we have been on the wrong track now for years. We have
been fixated upon end-states that are not only ultimately
unmeasurable, but are also normatively uninteresting even as
objectives. All the while we should have been looking toward
and legal rules can serve distributional purposes in different ways); Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 821,
835 (2000) (arguing that Sanchirico's thesis is misleading and does not require
modifying their earlier conclusion that legal rules are ill-suited for distributional
purposes).
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ethically salient opportunity "inputs" whose right distribution allows
rightful "outputs" to take care of themselves.
If collective action affects distributions of benefits and
burdens to our fellow persons, we cannot help but think through the
ethics of distribution: and if we find, on analysis, that distributive
ethics call out for the growing and spreading of material opportunity,
we must think through how that can be done.
Consider the breathtaking sweep of the research agenda that
opens. What are the actual determinants of real, equal-opportunity-
grounded well-being? What means can we develop for more
accurately defining the boundary between ethically exogenous and
ethically endogenous opportunities? How might we best design
means of spreading the former, so that the latter-the sole ethically
intelligible maximand-might be maximized? What institutions are
better suited for accomplishing this design, and how much functional
specialization of such institutions is possible? These questions and
others press upon us urgently the moment we see that we can no
longer dodge them.
For far too long now-just over a century, in fact-Paretian
complacency and its bedfellow, Kaldor-Hicksian wealth fetishism,
have worked as a mere ball and chain. They have conferred vetoes
upon beneficiaries of morally arbitrary distributions, and for no
normatively cognizable reason whatsoever. Now that we see they are
not only unnecessary, but in fact incompatible with prescription
itself, it is high time we tossed them.
Think of how liberating that will be. It will be freeing of us
and our fellows in our roles as human persons inhabiting an ever
more integrated globe, whose lives and life prospects together will
vastly improve as a result. It will be freeing of scholarship too-of
work that can now be both practically useful and theoretically sound.
Think also of what this will mean both for law and economics. Both
will be reconciled again to their origins, in ethics. Both will again be
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what once they were admitted to be-moral sciences.2 3 Both will be
healthy again. For they will be home.
203. Ethics and economics were of course once united under the Cambridge
"Moral Sciences Tripos." See, e.g., Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes 28-29
(1983) (discussing the moral philosophical roots of law and social sciences). And of
course Adam Smith, seemingly the patron saint of Chicago, lectured and wrote
not only on political economy, but upon ethics and jurisprudence as well. See, e.g.,
Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms (Edwin Cannan, ed.,
1896) (exploring the evolution of principles of governance, public jurisprudence
and the laws of nations as well as outlining the principles of domestic and private
law); Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (R. L. Meek et al. eds., 1978)
(evaluating the foundation of systems of government in different countries and
presenting his theory of rules by which civil government ought to be directed);
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Knud Haakonssen, ed., 2002)
(exploring the human ability to form moral judgments and proposing a theory of
sympathy).
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